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Nous sommes en 50 avant Jesus-Christ. Toute la Gaule est occupee par les Romains ... Toute? Non! Un village peuple
d'irreductibles Gaulois resiste encore et toujours 'a

l'envahisseur.1

I. A FABLE: ECONOMISTS INVADE LAW'S EMPIRE2

T HERE was a time when the empire of Law was not overrun
by economists. The economists had their own fiefdoms to be
sure-there was the Duchy of Antitrust and the Kingdom of Regulatory Law-but the economists lived in peace within these borders,
welcoming many unlike themselves into their midst, only gently

proselytizing their students in the first few classes of a term, and
swearing fealty to the law. It is true that a few marauders from beyond the borders saw the wealth of the empire and sought to
colonize it, but even the most daring, Archbishop Coase3 and Duke
Gary of Becker,4 for example, had too few troops to do much damage and largely failed in their attempts to convert the heathen. In
retrospect, however, it is clear that their assaults softened resistance.
When a new champion arose, this time not from beyond Law's borders but from within the heart of the kingdom, resistance crumbled
and the floodgates were opened.5 How proud Sir Richard Posner
must have felt when from behind the well-fortified ramparts of Castle Chicago, he saw bands of economists spreading over Law's

* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the "New Perspectives on
Evidence" Conference at the University of Virginia School of Law, February 23-24,
2001. I am grateful to Judge Richard Posner and other conference participants for
comments they made on my paper at that time. I am also grateful to Omri BenShahar for his comments on an earlier version of this paper and to University of
Michigan Reference Librarian Nancy Vettorello for her invaluable assistance. Work
on this article was supported in part by the Cook Funds of the University of Michigan
Law School.

1 Une Aventure D'Asterix: Asterix Le Gaulois 3 (Dargaud Ed. 1992) ("We are in
the year fifty B.C. All Gaul is occupied by the Romans .... All? No! One village
inhabited by unyielding Gauls continues to, and will always, resist the invader.")
(author's translation).
2 I hope economists will read this with the same smiles with which it is written.
I R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960).

4Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ.

169 (1968).

5 The work that marked this opening is Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of
Law (1972).
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terrain. Some of the fiercest and strongest fighters came from outside, but more, including some who were equally fierce, were willing
converts from the ranks of the empire's citizens.
Economists soon spread over much of Law's Empire, even colonizing areas like Criminallawland that once seemed implacably
hostile. In Law's oldest realms, the civil kingdoms of the common
law, the economists' triumph was such that it is today hard to find
respectable citizens who, if they have not interbred with, have at least
learned the language of the invaders. In other fiefdoms, like the
aforementioned Antitrust, the economists expelled most of the doctrinalists and others with whom they once cohabitated. Indeed, they
even intimidated the courts.
But one kingdom of Law's Empire held out. Few economists ventured into the rocky hills of Evidence, and even fewer citizens of
Evidenceland converted to the new faith.6 Evidenceland's inhabitants went about their business secure in their isolation and confident
in their defenses. They neither welcomed nor fought the few economists who ventured into their realm. Rather, they ignored them. But
now a clarion has sounded. That same Sir Richard (now Lord Posner) who triggered the initial all out assault on Law's Empire has
cast his eye on this lonely holdout kingdom and like Lars Porsena is
on the march. "Extraordinary," some will say, for Sir Richard has

long since been elevated from knight to Law Lord, a position of
wisdom that for lesser men means retirement from the field of battle.7
Now you seek an oracle. You ask, "What does this assault mean
for Evidenceland?" Let us read the entrails together.

6This is recognized by those who have tried to survey the literature on the
economics of evidence. See Richard D. Friedman, Economic Analysis of Evidentiary
Law: An Underused Tool, an Underplowed Field, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 1531, 1531

(1998); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 Stan.
L. Rev. 1477,1477-78 (1999).

7 But see Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (showing that even the most elevated law
lords do not always shun the risk of disgracing themselves in battle).
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II. EVIDENCE AND ECONOMICS
JOHN HENRY WIGMORE ON PRIVILEGES

(1)The communications must originate in confidence that they

will not be disclosed;

(2)This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full
and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the par-

ties;

(3)The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered; and

(4)The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure
of the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby
gained for the correct disposal of litigation.8
A. The Unimportance of Economics to Evidence: A Hypothesis

Judge Richard Posner,9 significantly expanding on observations
he has previously made,'0 has written what he justly calls "the first
comprehensive . . . economic analysis of" the law of evidence."
This is potentially a milestone, for as Posner notes, "the economic
literature dealing with the rules [of evidence law] themselves is
scanty in relation to the scope and importance of evidence law.""2 If
the economic perspective can shed new light on how courts are or
should be informed of facts, or if it simply challenges old explanations, new vistas for evidence research will be opened akin to the
lines of research opened by those doing what I once called "the
New Evidence Scholarship."'3 Even if Posner and other econo-

8 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law ? 2285, at 1 (2d ed.

1923).

9 Henceforth, I will drop the honorific "Judge" when referring to Judge Posner. No
disrespect is intended, but it is more efficient to refer to Judge Posner by just his last
name and, in my view, more felicitous stylistically as well.

10Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 600-01 (5th ed. 1998).
Posner, supra note 6, at 1478.

12Id. at 1477-78.

13Richard Lempert, The New Evidence Scholarship: Analyzing the Process of

Proof, 66 B.U. L. Rev. 439 (1986) (suggesting that new scholarly interest in evidence
has shifted the emphasis from the rules of evidence to the process of proof).
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mists"4 have little to offer evidence law
so will tell us something about evidence law and the scholarship
that informs it.
If the title of this Section has not already revealed my position, I
will state it directly: I do not think economics will have the same
impact on evidence scholarship as it has had on the study of torts,
contracts, property, and many other areas of law. Indeed, I do not

think it will have much impact at all, for I see it yielding few new

insights, and I expect it will rarely pose serious challenges to received wisdom in the field. This is not so much because what
Posner and other economists have to offer is silly or wrong (although some of it is certainly the latter). Rather it is because much
of it is uninteresting; either it says little of relevance to the world in
which evidence rules are applied, or what it says has long since
been seen by others. To judge by Posner's article, the insights of
economics are in large measure existing common sense. The economic perspective often tracks familiar modes of analysis and
endorses commonplace conclusions. Too often economics seems
not so much to add to the field's common sense as to place it on
stilts: Getting anywhere requires extra effort and the position is inherently unstable.
These are firmly stated conclusions, but I do not offer them that
way. Rather I offer them as hypotheses. Posner's synthetic commentary on the economics of evidence law is a welcome vehicle to
test these hypotheses, for if any scholar can disprove them, it is
likely to be Posner. But before turning to his work, let me suggest
reasons why economists have shied away from evidence law and
why what economics has to offer evidence law is likely to be limited.
1. Not News
First, the rational actor perspective that is associated with economics is already well represented in evidence law; indeed I would

argue that it dominates the field.1" Wigmore's requisites for privi14 When I speak of economists in this paper, I refer not just to people with advanced
degrees in economics but to law professors who apply the models and methods of law
and economics in their work.

15 See also Michael L. Seigel, A Pragmatic Critique of Modern Evidence
Scholarship, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 995, 996 (1994) ("[T]he state of contemporary
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leges, which I quoted to start this Part, have the same rational actor
roots as Judge Learned Hand's famous formula in United States v.
Carroll Towing Co.,'6 the rock on which the economic approach to
tort law is built. Posner claims the rational actor perspective for
economics,'7 but if this is all economics can offer evidence law,
there is no need for the gift. We already have it, some would claim
to excess.'8
2. No Fit
JUSTICE ROBERT H. JACKSON ON IMPEACHMENT BY PRIOR BAD
ACTS

We concur in the general opinion of courts, textwriters and the
profession that much of this law is archaic, paradoxical and full
of compromises and compensations by which an irrational advantage to one side is offset by a poorly reasoned counterprivilege
to the other. But somehow it has proved a workable even if
clumsy system when moderated by discretionary controls in the
hands of a wise and strong trial court. To pull one misshapen
stone out of the grotesque structure is more likely simply to up-

evidence scholarship can be traced to evidence scholars' near-universal acceptance of

'optimistic rationalism . .."').

16 159 F.2d 169,173 (2d Cir. 1947).
17 This rational actor perspective, with its close attention to costs and benefits, is not
distinctive to economics but is also encountered in sociology, political science, law,
and other disciplines.
18 Seigel, supra note 15. The rationalist who seeks to maximize truth finding at trial
differs from the rational person of economics who seeks to maximize social welfare.
But Posner argues that there is a link between truth finding and social welfare
mediated by deterrence. Posner, supra note 6, at 1481-84. Hence, Posner casts much
of his analysis of evidence rules in terms of what they contribute to truth finding. It is
the coincidence between traditional evidence law scholarship's concern for truth and
Posner's general equation of true verdicts with verdicts that promote social welfare
that allows me to claim that much of what Posner's economic analysis offers evidence
law is already familiar to evidence scholars and often even part of the field's common
sense. Even if Posner is right about the relationship between accurate verdicts and
deterrence, however, not all social welfare implications of evidence law are

determined by that law's implications for getting at the truth. In some cases, most
notably privilege law, other welfare implications of evidence law are seen as
outweighing the truth. Here, too, however, the economist's rational actor perspective
is not just familiar to evidence scholars, but rather, as the quotation from Wigmore on
privileges suggests, it has dominated their analysis.
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set its present balance between adverse interests than to establish a rational edifice.9

Justice Jackson's well-known statement on impeachment by
prior bad acts is a second reason why economics is of limited use in

sophisticated evidentiary analysis. If the rational actor perspective
has dominated traditional evidence scholarship and motivates (or
at least rationalizes) many of the rules that exist, apparent irrationalities also permeate the system. Economists perhaps have tools to
identify and clear up these irrationalities, but the problem to which
Justice Jackson's quote eloquently testifies is not that evidence
scholars are unaware of the irrationalities that exist.20 Rather it is
that evidence law often reflects complex compromises between different goals, with uncertain implications for the quality of verdicts.
For example, we want to get at the truth in litigation. We are more
likely to get at the truth if witnesses tell what they know. We are
worried, however, that interested witnesses will lie-indeed once
we were so worried that we would not let parties testify under oath.
But barring interested witnesses does not make sense, since they
are likely to know more about what happened than anyone else.
As a compromise, we let interested witnesses testify but allow them
to be impeached by bad acts apparently relating to veracity, by
testimony that they have bad reputations for truth and veracity, by
criminal convictions that suggest dishonesty, and, often, by any felony. Moreover, since interestedness comes in degrees and may be
shaped by such subtleties as who calls an apparently disinterested
witness ,21 we apply these rules of impeachment to all witnesses.

11 Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 486 (1948).

20 Interestingly, some rules that seem irrational today are legacies of policies that at
one time seemed rational. Thus, with a different view of the dangers of hearsay and
human psychology, hearsay exceptions, like the excited utterance exception and the
dying declaration, were at one time self-evidently justified from a rational actor
perspective. Today, changed views about the most likely sources of testimonial error
and what leads to truth-telling lead many to regard these exceptions as poorly
justified if the goal is to admit reliable hearsay. These examples caution us against
giving too great weight to what may appear to be reasonable assumptions about what
is rational. Tomorrow we may think differently.
21 Neil Vidmar & Nancy MacDonald Laird, Adversary Social Roles: Their Effects
on Witnesses' Communication of Evidence and the Assessments of Adjudicators, 44
J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 888, 895 (1983).
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Perhaps the most striking impeachment rule is not the bad acts
rule which was the subject of Justice Jackson's opinion, but Federal
Rule of Evidence 609, which often places a price (possible exposure of a past crime) on a convicted felon's decision to take the
stand, even though his self-interest is clear.22 From a cost-benefit
perspective, the obvious question is whether this rule does more to
discourage or successfully impeach testimony by witnesses who absent the rule might lie convincingly if they testified than it does to
impeach the testimony of truthful witnesses or to discourage their
testimony. When the witness is a criminal defendant, there is reason to think that dishonest denials of guilt are more likely to be
discouraged or discredited than honest protestations of innocence.
True stories usually hang together better than false ones, and they
are probably harder to discredit by cross-examination. Hence, innocent defendants are likely to appear more credible than guilty
ones, even, or indeed maybe especially, when both have prior records. This means the innocent are more likely than the guilty to

think that the gains from testifying will offset the prejudice of impeachment. Moreover, an attorney seeking to keep a client from
testifying in order to prevent perjury has in the impeachment rule a
powerful tool of persuasion that will typically be wielded only
against guilty defendants. Hence the rule seems justified-or does
it?
The question we asked is only a starting point. Suppose impeachment by prior felony convictions were not allowed. Presumably,
more innocent, truth-telling defendants and more guilty, lying defendants would take the stand. But would the gains from disallowing
prior conviction impeachment be the same for both groups? Arguably not. Although both would benefit by avoiding prejudice and
perhaps by appearing more credible, one would expect the guilty to
be more likely to be thought liars than the innocent, because their
stories would have holes that would tend to make their lies transparent. Moreover, their attorneys might do little to help them
make their stories convincing or might try to dissuade them from
testifying. So, even if the threat of prior conviction impeachment
dissuades proportionately fewer innocent than guilty defendants
from testifying or is less likely to render the truthful testimony of

22 Fed. R. Evid. 609.
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innocent defendants incredible, the threat or realization of impeachment by prior convictions may still lead to more wrongful
convictions than its abolition would to mistaken acquittals.23 This is
because the marginal harm (that is, convictions that would not occur given only the other evidence) to guilty defendants will be
small if we are correct in hypothesizing that almost all would be
convicted whether or not they testify or, if they testify, are impeached, while the harm to innocent defendants even if rare will be
great since they would be acquitted if they testified and were not
impeached.24
We can thus, under one set of assumptions, conclude that innocent defendants are harmed more by the felony impeachment rule
than guilty defendants would be helped by its abolition, but do we
know this to be true? No. If we are nonetheless willing to assume
this to be true, do we have any idea of the extent to which it is
true? None at all, I think. Moreover, true or not, is it politically
feasible to ban felony impeachment? In most jurisdictions, no.
Prosecutors would scream too loudly, for convictions would be
harder to achieve. When prosecutors scream loudly, they are usually heard by legislators. Does this mean that criticizing the felony
impeachment rule for its purported unfairness and irrationality is

23 If these suppositions are true, and we count the cost of mistaken verdicts in either
direction the same, prior conviction impeachment should be forbidden if equal
numbers of guilty and innocent defendants are brought to trial. If, as seems likely,
more guilty than innocent defendants are tried, the rule might lead to more correct
verdicts in the aggregate, even if innocent defendants were more likely than guilty

defendants to be harmed by the rule or helped by its abolition. Normatively, however,
we may wish to weigh the cost of wrongfully convicting innocent defendants far more
than the cost of wrongfully acquitting guilty ones. The position has strong cultural and
philosophical support. From a different perspective, however, one can argue that the
social costs of wrongful acquittals exceed those of wrongful convictions since the
wrongfully acquitted defendant may commit more crimes. This may be why there is
no evidence that the seriousness of crimes reduces mistaken convictions, and, in
particular, why the insanity defense is notoriously unsuccessful. Even if people share a
sense that it is worse to convict someone wrongfully of rape or murder than of writing
bad checks, this sense is likely to be outweighed by the difference in perceived costs
associated with wrongful acquittals.
24Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel's data suggest that compared to testifying and not
being impeached by prior convictions, not testifying or testifying and being impeached
are about equal in their tendencies to raise the probability of conviction. Their reported
data do not tell us about the factual guilt of those who might have been harmed by the
rule's existence. Harry Kalven, Jr. & Hans Zeisel, The American Jury, 177-81, 388-89
(1966).
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pointless?25 No. Some courts have been persuaded to limit felony
impeachment because of such arguments, and the contours of Federal Rule 609 and its state counterparts have been shaped by
conflicting interests and arguments. Ultimately we have a compromise between intuitions about the probative value of evidence,
intuitions about how the threat of impeachment affects decisions to
testify, ideals about the precautions we should take in protecting
the innocent, desires to convict the guilty, and the political power
of various interest groups.
What is economic analysis, or rational actor analysis, going to do
with such a mess? Can it get us out of it? No, again. Economic
analysis is at its most powerful when there are clear, objectively
measurable values to be maximized (or minimized). You cannot
maximize a compromise. At best you can suggest tradeoffs that will
allow clearer thinking about an issue or maximize some value given
constraints on other values that figure in the mix. But suggestions
based on questionable assumptions are likely to be of limited practical utility, and it is dangerous to base policy on them.
What we need and are unlikely to get is empirical information.
For example, with respect to Federal Rule 609, it would be good to
know, among other things, what prior felony convictions tell us
about the propensity of a defendant to lie beyond a defendant's
obvious self-interest,26 how this information affects juries, and
whether the fact of a criminal conviction interacts with the quality
of a defendant's story such that liars are hurt more than truthtellers by prior conviction impeachment. We also need good theories about how lawyers and witnesses would react to changed rules,
for rule changes that would be salutary at present might not be so

25 The bad act impeachment rule seems less irrational because the rule limits those
bad acts that can be considered to acts that relate to veracity. The same is true of the
non-felony prong of the prior conviction rule, which applies only to convictions for
crimes involving dishonesty. But although these rules appear more rational in that the
impeachment they allow seems more probative of veracity, we do not know if
defendants impeached by evidence allowed under these rules are less likely to testify
honestly than defendants who are not vulnerable to such impeachment or whether
such impeachment makes for more accurate juror assessments of witness credibility.
Even if the assumed relationship of witness credibility to past behavior that motivates
these rules is generally correct, the relationship may not hold for the group of highly
selected and obviously self-interested criminal defendants who take the stand.
26 1 am aware the rule applies to all witnesses and not just criminal defendants, but
the situation of the criminal defendant is complex enough to illustrate my point.
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once the system adjusted to them. In short, Justice Jackson may be
right in suggesting that any effort to escape the current mess is as
likely to create a bigger mess as to improve the situation.
Indeed, maybe we do not have a mess at all, if the goal is accurate verdicts. To know whether we do requires information about
the base rate of guilty offenders among those impeachable by prior
felonies. If it is high enough, the prejudicial effect of prior conviction evidence might increase the proportion of correctly decided
cases, even if all probative value is lacking. This information would,
however, leave open the question of the desired tradeoff between
wrongful convictions and wrongful acquittals. While rational actor
analysis might help us sort out some of the issues here, it cannot
provide the final answer. Sorting out issues may, of course, itself be

a contribution, but I do not think the problems we face in deciding
whether Federal Rule 609 is desirable stem from not understanding
the issues. Rather the problems exist because we lack relevant empirical information and disagree on values.
The fact that economics today has little to say about the virtues
of rules like Federal Rule 609 does not mean that we are unable to
rationally argue its merits. Indeed, experimental evidence supports

the common sense judgment that prior crimes evidence prejudices
juries against defendants, even when it has no strong bearing on
credibility.27 It is not silly to argue that if prior conviction evidence
is unrelated to credibility it should be barred as impeachment, even
if the base rate guilt among impeachable defendants is so high that
the prejudice the evidence engenders is likely to reduce substan-

tially overall verdict error. We can reject this information, and with
it the economic perspective, because trials are not just about getting facts right. They are about getting facts right for certain
reasons (for example, a prejudice-free rational evaluation of the
evidence that leads to a particular conclusion) by following certain
procedures (for example, without torture and with confrontation).

27 Valerie P. Hans & Anthony N. Doob, Section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act and
the Deliberations of Simulated Juries, 18 Crim. L.Q. 235, 248-51 (1976); H. Richard
Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice in the
Courtroom, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 845, 867-69 (1982).
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One can argue that there is nonetheless a role for the economic
perspective here. Posner, for example, tells us that maximizing the
proportion of cases decided correctly is desirable because it helps
achieve intended deterrence.28 But economics cannot tell us whether
deterring crime is more important than condemning torture or

what degree of deterrence is worth what amount of torture. More

to the point, it cannot tell us whether deterring crimes by convicting guilty people is of greater value than maintaining a system
which convicts no one, guilty or innocent, because of the prejudicial effects of minimally probative evidence. Even if one has strong
intuitions favoring deterrence, these intuitions may not apply to the

marginal case where the incremental increase in deterrence from
convicting a guilty person is small, but the injustice of securing a
conviction through prejudice is as high as it was in the first case. It
may be that all cases determined by the prejudicial effects of prior
conviction evidence are on the margin.29
It is nonetheless possible that a formal economic analysis can
clarify the implication of different assumptions for tradeoffs between values and so might elucidate or call into question the logic
of particular policy arguments. But I would like to see such an exercise before concluding that economic analysis is likely to add to
what those who have pondered different evidence rules have discovered without the aid of economics.
3. Wrong Aim

A third reason to be skeptical of what the economic perspective
can offer evidence is that trials aim not at correct results,30 but at
justice. Justice usually entails correct results but does not necessarily
do so. If, for example, the evidence against a person is an illegally

18Posner, supra note 6, at 1483. On this point, see infra notes 63-78 and accompanying
text.

291 am ignoring the fact that in Posner's model, the wrongful conviction of the innocent
also diminishes deterrence. Posner, supra note 6, at 1483. This further complicates the
situation and, absent empirical information, further reduces the likelihood that economic
analysis will provide answers to Federal Rule 609 policy problems.
30 Again, I want to remind the reader that I am here taking Posner's claim that his is
a comprehensive economic analysis of evidence law at face value. Economists might
argue that a normative economic analysis seeks rules that maximize social welfare and
that a positive analysis would examine evidence rules with the implications for social
welfare in mind. Posner, however, sees correct verdicts as welfare maximizing decisions.
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coerced confession coupled with unconvincing circumstantial evidence, the just result is a not guilty verdict, even if the judge or jury
has heard the confession and finds it convincing. Moreover, justice
entails certain procedures.31 Correct results might be more likely if
honest witnesses could not be cross-examined, yet we would regard
it as unjust if a judge denied parties the right to cross-examine
those witnesses she thought were honest, even if the judge was an
excellent judge of honesty.32
The economic approach aims at maximizing values and identifying tradeoffs. Most commonly, it is about maximizing efficiency,
not in the colloquial sense of the term but in the sense that overall
social welfare is enhanced if particular arrangements are made or
certain trades consummated. Often moves that are efficient in the
colloquial sense, in that they cost less and engender lower levels of
waste than competing moves, are also efficient in the economic sense,
but this need not be so. Just trials may require procedures that seem
inefficient in both the colloquial and technical sense, if reaching accurate verdicts with minimal expense is the criterion by which
efficiency is measured.33 Colloquially inefficient procedures may,
however, yield technically efficient results because justice cannot

31 I cannot prove the claims I make in this paragraph about the priority of justice as
empirical facts, because definitions of justice may be contested; I do, however, have
some confidence in the proposition that the priority of justice over correct results is
deeply rooted in American legal culture, as exemplified in the Fourth through Seventh
Amendments to the Constitution and realized in court decisions over the two centuries
since the Bill of Rights was enacted. At the conference at which this paper was presented,
Posner professed not to know what this thing called "justice" was. See Richard A. Posner,
Comment on Lempert on Posner, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1619, 1717 (2001). I suggest he begin
with the Bill of Rights, and note that when he acts as Judge Posner, ideas of justice do
not seem so foreign to him. See, e.g., United States v. Santos, 201 F.3d 953 (7th Cir.
2000) (reversing lower court for error causing prejudice to defendant). Also, justice
may be defined operationally based on people's reactions to outcomes, distributions,
and procedure. A large body of psychological research does this. Indeed, at least one
journal, Social Justice Research, is devoted to the topic.

321 think the analysis holds even if the opposing party's sole purpose in crossexamining the witness is to shake the witness's story rather than to place it in context
or develop additional information favorable to his side.
33 Compare John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 823, 823-25 (1985) (explaining the relative advantages of the German
procedural systems where judges direct the fact gathering), with Samuel R. Gross,
The American Advantage: The Value of Inefficient Litigation, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 734

(1987) (arguing that efficiency is a poor measure of a procedural system's quality and
that inefficiency has some advantages).
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be ruled out as a component of social welfare. Thus costlier procedures may be welfare-enhancing, even if they yield the same or,
indeed, less accurate results than other less expensive procedures.34
Although valuing justice is not necessarily antithetical to the
economic perspective, economists seem to have no way to get hold
of this problem except by narrowing the conception of trial justice
in ways that defy common understanding. Economists like Posner
cannot measure justice in units commensurate with either the costs
of legal processes or the values of accurate verdicts, and so justice
is either ignored in their analyses or equated with accurate verdicts.
Without models that value and measure procedural justice,
economists cannot say what rules of evidence or trial procedure are
just.35 Thus they are hard pressed to help us understand what justice means in the trial context.
Economics can, in theory, help us understand some of the costs
or tradeoffs that different rules or procedures entail, and this information may influence beliefs about what procedural justice
demands. Some authors taking an economic perspective, especially

-a4Professors Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell have written an impressive, almost
encyclopedic, work in which they argue that, from a normative standpoint, social
welfare, properly conceived, does all the work one might ask of the concept "justice"
and does it better. They acknowledge, however, that a taste for justice is a value
included in a properly conceived social welfare function. Many philosophers will take
issue with the Kaplow-Shavell analysis, but even accepting it, my arguments hold if
our collective taste for justice at trials is substantial, as I believe it is. Moreover, despite
their acknowledgment that justice tastes are values that are properly included in social
welfare functions, their discussion largely neglects tastes for justice or tries to reduce
them to other preferences. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus
Welfare, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 961 (2001).
35 Research indicates that the perceived justice of legal processes depends more on
the procedures used than the outcomes reached. Jonathan D. Casper, American
Criminal Justice: The Defendant's Perspective 168-72 (1972); E. Allan Lind & Tom
R. Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice 66 (1988). In commenting on
this paper, Posner suggested that justice was such an amorphous concept that it was
impossible to talk rationally about it, and it should therefore not be part of our
discourse. See Posner, supra note 31, at 1717. I disagree. Justice can be operationally
defined and measured. Moreover, perceptions of justice motivate many activities,
some with obvious economic dimensions that I am sure Posner would recognize. For
example, Lind and his colleagues found that when arbitration proceedings were regarded
as fair, litigants were less likely to seek trial de novo. E. Allan Lind, Arbitrating HighStakes Cases: An Evaluation of Court-Annexed Arbitration in a United States District
Court, at xiv (1990); E. Allan Lind et al., Individual and Corporate Dispute Resolution:
Using Procedural Fairness as a Decision Heuristic, 38 Admin. Sci. Q. 224,224-25 (1993).
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those writing on the attorney-client privilege, have attempted to do
this,36 but they do not always agree,37 and most such discussions

have done little to enhance prior understandings of privileges or
the cases for and against them. Indeed, so long as economists assume rather than investigate states of the world and causal relations,
I doubt they will add much of great value to evidence scholarship,
for evidence scholars have shown themselves to be quite skilled at
imagining and manipulating plausible world states. Evidence is
likely to gain substantially from economists laboring in its vineyard

only if economists become empirical as well as (or instead of) theoretical laborers. I have not yet found empirical work by an economist

interested in evidence law.38
4. Barriers to Comprehension

A fourth reason evidence law is likely to remain largely unaffected
by law and economics is language: Much of the best economic analysis
is formal and quantitative; it is written in a mathematical language
that few evidence teachers and fewer judges can understand.39 This

36See, e.g, Ronald J. Allen et al., A Positive Theory of the Attorney-Client Privilege
and the Work Product Doctrine, 19 J. Legal Stud. 359 (1990); Stephen McG. Bundy &
Einer Richard Elhauge, Do Lawyers Improve the Adversary System? A General
Theory of Litigation Advice and Its Regulation, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 313, 402 (1991);
Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the
Production of Information, 1981 Sup. Ct. Rev. 309, 356; Louis Kaplow & Stephen
Shavell, Legal Advice About Information to Present in Litigation: Its Effects and
Social Desirability, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 565 (1989).

37 Compare Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 36, at 315 (noting that litigation advice

generally increases a tribunal's ability to do its job), with Kaplow & Shavell, supra
note 36, at 568 (finding that "there is no a priori basis for believing that such advice
tends to promote socially desirable behavior").
38In commenting on this paper, Posner reads my several suggestions that economists
have most to offer evidence by doing empirical work as demeaning. See Posner, supra
note 31, at 1714. He seemed to feel that I was suggesting that economists uncover
information which true evidence scholars could use and then get out of the way. I do
not mean my remarks this way, but instead write as an admirer of econometric methods
and what empirically oriented economists have been able to learn from them. Moreover,
I expect empirical economists to remain economists, with economic theory guiding
their problem selection and analyses. I also recognize the value of formal modeling in
clarifying thinking and guiding empirical research. See, e.g., Richard Lempert &
Joseph Sanders, An Invitation to Law and Social Sciences 137-95 (1986).
39 See, e.g., Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, On the Economics of
Trials: Adversarial Process, Evidence, and Equilibrium Bias, 16 J.L. Econ. & Org. 365
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is not, of course, an insurmountable barrier. Formal economists
regularly present crucial assumptions of their models and the implications of their findings in English. Also, when an economist's
ideas are valuable for understanding or critiquing the law, either
the original author or some follower is likely to express those ideas
in language all can understand. But when a model's assumptions

are sufficiently unreal that results seem likely to have little practical import or when they echo ideas already present in the evidence
literature or are otherwise not surprising, the translation of formal
analyses for the non-mathematically inclined is less likely. For this

reason, I expect the formal modelers in economics are likely to talk
mainly to other economists.40
Evidence law is an exciting area to teach and write about be-

cause it is both theoretically rich and intensely practical. Unlike
torts and contracts, which have provided rich fields for economists
to plow, evidence law is not concerned with the theoretically best
way of allocating goods. Nor is it intended as a set of default rules
when parties cannot agree on how to resolve their disputes. Evidence rules are intended to be applied, not bargained around.
Although parties can contract around some evidence rules, explicitly through stipulations and implicitly by failing to object to what
an opponent offers, parties who use the rules of evidence are not
doing so because they have been unable to agree on more mutually
advantageous rules of admissibility.41 The idea that parties should

(2000); Joel Schrag & Suzanne Scotchmer, Crime and Prejudice: The Use of
Character Evidence in Criminal Trials, 10 J.L. Econ. & Org. 319 (1994).
40 In his comments, Posner suggests that I approve of mathematical ignorance and that
all legal academics could be expected to have some facility with mathematics. See
Posner, supra note 31, at 1715. I agree with the latter proposition as an aspiration, but
empirically, the aspiration is not always realized. More to the point, I was not talking
about a mathematical education that enables one to follow and critique the kind of
simple equations and manipulations of inequalities that one finds in Posner's work.
Rather, I am thinking of work like that which Jennifer Reinganum and her colleagues
do, where substantial training in mathematics and economics would aid greatly in
following the argument. Also, let me be clear, this is a positive prediction, not a
normative claim. I do not mean to suggest that economists should not engage in
complex formal modeling or that nothing valuable can come from it or even that
models based on implausible assumptions are useless. I mean merely to suggest that
these characteristics limit the likely penetration of economics, even very good economics,
into evidence scholarship.

41 Of course, being in court represents an often costly failure to resolve differences.
But the differences that are not resolved are not differences over obligations, given
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bargain over the body of rules that will govern the admissibility of
evidence, given that they are taking a dispute to court, is not on the

radar screen of most lawyers.42
While purely theoretical thinking can inform evidence law,43
most evidence scholarship, even if theoretically informed, aims at
practical application. What the field needs today is not so much

new theoretical perspectives as reliable empirical information.
Evidence law does not need formally derived conclusions from
admittedly incomplete or questionable assumptions. The work
done on evidence law to date suggests that economists are more
likely to provide the latter than the former.
I do not mean to say that economists are unconcerned with the
empirical. On the contrary, economists have made important em-

pirical contributions to understanding law.44 Moreover, experimental
economics45 and the new behavioral economics46 are both intensely

the rules of evidence, but rather differences over obligations, given tort law, contract
law, antitrust law, etc.
42 Occasionally, there may be agreement on the application of a few select rules; for
example, parties may agree to present video depositions rather than live testimony or
may mutually stipulate to the qualifications of experts. The choice of alternative dispute
resolution may also reflect an agreement on what evidence rules should control.
43 Some very interesting work is theoretical in nature. See, e.g., L. Jonathan Cohen,

The Probable and the Provable (1977); Allen et al., supra note 36. Much of the best
evidence scholarship, as with scholarship in other areas, usually has an important
theoretical component. Hence I do not mean to suggest that evidence scholars should
suppress their theoretical instincts. Indeed, I have written purely theoretical work
myself. See Richard O. Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1021 (1977).
44See, e.g., Frank A. Sloan et al., Suing for Medical Malpractice (1993); Ian Ayres,
Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 Harv.
L. Rev. 817 (1991); George J. Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market:
An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 Am. Econ. Rev. 132 (1973);
Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in
the Diamond Industry, 21 J. Legal Stud. 115 (1992); John J. Donohue III, Advocacy
Versus Analysis in Assessing Employment Discrimination Law, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 1583

(1992); James J. Heckman & Brook S. Payner, Determining the Impact of Federal
Antidiscrimination Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks: A Study of South
Carolina, 79 Am. Econ. Rev. 138 (1989).
45See, e.g., Colin Camerer, Individual Decision Making, in The Handbook of
Experimental Economics 587 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995); Elizabeth
Hoffman et al., Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games, 7
Games & Econ. Behav. 346 (1994); Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer,
Experimental Law and Economics: An Introduction, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 991 (1985);
Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in
the Market, 76 Am. Econ. Rev. 728 (1986).
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interested in how people actually reach decisions. But when
economists are not dealing with inherently economic variables or
values that can be easily monetized, there is often little that is distinctively economic about their empirical research beyond
econometric methods that are now common throughout the social
sciences. Moreover, when empirical economists use the methods
and adopt the perspective of social psychology, cognitive psychology, sociology, or even anthropology, we may benefit from excellent
research, but it is often work that people in these other disciplines
do equally well. Economists do not monopolize the study of economic variables.
This does not mean that economic variables have no role to play
in analyzing evidence law or that the likely behavior of the selfinterested rational actor we think of as economic man has no role
to play in understanding evidence law. If, however, we limit ourselves to economic variables and the rational actor model of
human behavior, our research will be impoverished and inadequate
to the tasks of developing positive models of the evolution and operation of rules of evidence and workable normative models of
how systems of evidence law should operate. Economic considerations should figure in both the positive and normative analysis of
evidence law, but they are factors of greater or lesser importance,
not master variables.
5. Incentive Structures

A final reason why I do not think economic analysis will have a
substantial long-run impact on evidence law is that I expect politics
and its implications for opportunity structures to limit the number
of economists attracted to the study of evidence. Although the field
of law and economics today encompasses scholars of all political
persuasions, and the economic perspective does not necessarily
yield conservative or pro-big business results, it is no secret that the
growth of law and economics during the 1970s and 1980s was fueled by presumed ties between the economics perspective and
conservative, especially pro-business, political agendas. Educational programs for lawyers and judges paid for by private

46Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L.
Rev. 1471 (1998).
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foundations had a distinctly Chicago-economics slant, and many of
those who wrote from the then-new law and economics perspective
were regarded as leading conservative theorists or foes of the regu-

latory state.47 Moreover, the widespread acceptance within law and
economics of the Kalder-Hicks concept of efficiency can have profoundly conservative implications in a highly unequal society, since

it brackets (if it does not deny) the existence of distributional issues.

Although there is no political orthodoxy among those doing law
and economics today, it is still fair to say that a generalized faith in
the efficiency of free markets and frequent inattention to issues of
distributive justice give an anti-regulation and politically conservative cast to much of the legal scholarship that takes an economic
perspective. Moreover, and from a positive point of view more importantly, major funders of law and economics seem to have a pro-

business, anti-regulation, and/or generally conservative political
agenda they wish to promote. Although the Olin Foundation's
support of this conference and its willingness to support intellectual
activities that promote no coherent social agenda are contrary to
my hypothesis, I still do not believe that evidence law will be a high
priority for support among law and economics research funders.48

47 Many names could be given; among the most prominent were Richard Posner,
Henry Manne, and Frank Easterbrook.
48 In connection with litigation, there has been some major corporate funding of
empirical research on trials. Following the punitive damage award in the ExxonValdez disaster, the Exxon Corporation invested substantial sums in jury-related and
other research on punitive damages, yielding at least six law review articles. Elizabeth
Amon, Exxon Bankrolls Critics of Punitives, Nat'l L.J., May 17, 1999, at Al. Even
before this, in disputes about the right to jury trial in complex cases, corporations
invested in historical research on the domain of the civil jury in 1791. See generally
Morris S. Arnold, A Historical Inquiry into the Right to Trial by Jury in Complex
Civil Litigation, 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 829 (1980) (explaining how English courts in 1791
accounted for the practical limitations of jurors); Patrick Devlin, Jury Trial of
Complex Cases: English Practice at the Time of the Seventh Amendment, 80 Colum. L.
Rev. 43 (1980) (same). But these efforts, even when they have involved economists,
have by and large not involved economic research. See, e.g., Reid Hastie & W. Kip
Viscusi, What Juries Can't Do Well: The Jury's Performance as a Risk Manager, 40
Ariz. L. Rev. 901 (1998) (attempting to show that because of hindsight bias and other
reasons, jury verdicts in tort litigation are poorly suited to risk regulation); Cass R.
Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation
in Law), 107 Yale L.J. 2071 (1998) (reporting an experiment that shows substantial
variability in the punitive damage awards of mock jurors). Even where economists
have largely claimed an area as their own, as with hedonic damages, the survey
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Not only does evidence law not deal with issues that are at the core
of what funders hope to establish through economic research, but,
as Posner points out, when the lamp of economics shines on evidence law, what it reveals is not necessarily compatible with
conservative or big business political agendas.49 Posner, for example, argues that a law and economics perspective supports the
institution of jury trial,50 a message that business supporters of law

and economics are unlikely to relish.5'
If I may (in the best tradition of law and economics) rely on a
reasonable assumption, I assume that law and economics scholars
(perhaps more than most legal scholars) respond to financial incentives such as research support, leave money, and consulting fees.
Since I expect the economics of evidence to be a low priority for
funders of law and economics scholars, I expect that even without
the difficulties I mention above, few economists will be drawn to
issues in this area.52

research techniques and analytical methods they have used have not been distinctly
economic in nature, but could have been done, and sometimes have been done, by
sociologists and psychologists as well as by economists. See, e.g., Gregory W. Joseph
et al., Admissibility of Expert Psychological Testimony in the Era of Daubert: The
Case of Hedonic Damages, 18 Am. J. Forensic Psychol. 3 (2000); W. Kip Viscusi, The
Value of Life in Legal Contexts: Survey and Critique, 2 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 195
(2000).
49 Posner, supra note 6, at 1542.
50 Id.

11 This does not mean that they are right in looking unkindly on jury trials. The best
and most complete discussion of how juries treat business cases sharply questions the
existence of an irrational anti-big business bias among most jurors. Valerie P. Hans,
Business on Trial: The Civil Jury and Corporate Responsibility (2000).
52 1 do not intend this discussion of incentives to have any normative implications.
Rather, I am making observations (which may be wrong) about support for law and
economics research and motivations for that support, which I think has implications
for the likelihood that those who specialize in law and economics will make a substantial
investment in understanding evidence law. I should add that the primary motive for
scholars to explore an issue is not a focused external incentive but the inherent
interest of an issue and the sense that one can contribute to its resolution. I think this
is as true of legal economists as it is of other legal scholars. The discussion in this
Section is only meant to suggest that economists not otherwise fascinated by evidence
issues are unlikely to find that financial incentives direct their attention to evidence as
an area of inquiry.
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B. Only Hypotheses
I have sketched several reasons why I think law and economics

has hitherto left the field of evidence largely alone and why I think
the law and economics perspective has little new or otherwise undiscoverable to offer evidence scholarship. But to make these claims,
even if they strike readers as reasonable, is not to prove them.
Rather they must be regarded as hypotheses. Posner's article provides an opportunity to test my hypothesis that evidence law has
relatively little to gain from attracting the interest of economists. If
anyone can refute this proposition, it is he. In the next Part, I examine Posner's article in detail. I shall point to places where I think

Posner builds his analysis on false assumptions, to places where
economic analysis yields only common sense or familiar results, to
many places where empirical research has far more to offer than
theoretical economics, and to a few places where I think economics
may have something new to offer evidence. We shall see also that
much of what Posner offers is not a distinctly economic approach
but either a non-rigorous rational choice perspective of a kind that
has influenced, if not dominated, evidence scholarship at least since
Bentham or formal thinking about matters like naked statistical evidence that are for the most part familiar. After discussing Posner's
scholarship, I will turn to the work of others who have drawn on
economics to illuminate aspects of evidence law and see if their
work makes a stronger case than Posner's for the utility of economics to evidence law.
III. POSNER'S ANALYSIS

A. Theory and Institutions

1. Core Concepts
Perhaps the most striking feature of Posner's article is how broadly

he defines core concepts. I have already alluded to his encompassing view of what constitutes the economics perspective. He takes a
similarly broad view of evidence law. Although Posner defines the
law of evidence as "the body of rules that determines what, and
how, information may be provided to a legal tribunal that must re-
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solve a factual dispute,"53 his analysis roams beyond these boundaries.
Both the institution of jury trial and the adversary system are grist
for his mill. The Federal Rules of Evidence and their common law
ancestry, which are almost the sole focus of law school evidence
courses,54 receive relatively scant attention.55 I must confess I was
disappointed. It is not that the institutional and other issues Posner
directs his attention toward are uninteresting. They are well worth
discussing, perhaps more so than the Federal Rules, because they
are more fundamental to how our factfinding system works. But the
detailed economic analysis of the Federal Rules that I was looking
forward to seeing, because I, and other evidence teachers, confront
them every day, is, to a large extent, lacking.
I take the shape of Posner's article as some support for my thesis
that economics has little to offer evidence law. If I may draw on the
extended metaphor with which I opened this article, most of Posner's
attention is directed to evidence law's hinterland; indeed much of it
is directed at areas that evidence scholars regard as neighboring
kingdoms. Understanding evidence law and its normative analysis
requires knowledge of related institutions like the adversary and
jury systems, but these institutions are not central to evidence law's
domain and seldom are discussed in depth in evidence courses. This
point is not a criticism of Posner's work, for the topics he looks at
are well worth examination. But I think the fact that Posner pays
so much attention to issues that are peripheral to most evidence
scholarship, relative to the attention he gives the rules of evidence,
may say something about the likely utility of economics to the
study of evidence rules.
Posner's effort to show an economic logic at the heart of evidence law and in the design of trial systems rests on assumptions
about the factfinding process and on the implications of getting
things right. I find his assumptions reasonable, but I do not believe
they are always correct. Hence the structure Posner builds on these
53 Posner, supra note 6, at 1477.
5See, e.g., Eric D. Green & Charles R. Nesson, Problems, Cases, and Materials on

Evidence (1983); John Kaplan et al., Cases and Materials on Evidence (7th ed. 1992);
Richard 0. Lempert et al., A Modern Approach to Evidence: Text, Problems,
Transcripts and Cases (3d ed. 2000); Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick,
Evidence Under the Rules: Text, Cases and Problems (4th ed. 2000).
55 Only twenty-six of sixty pages are devoted to analyses of the Federal Rules, and of

these, six pages are devoted to a non-rule-oriented analysis of expert evidence.
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assumptions and the conclusions he reaches do not necessarily apply to the real world of trials or to evidence law in practice.
2. The Efficient Search for Evidence

The first set of assumptions Posner makes concerns the costs and
benefits of searching for evidence. Benefits are a positive function
of the stakes in the case and of the probability that if sought evidence is considered by the trier of fact, the case will be decided
correctly; the costs of a trial are a positive function of the amount
of evidence, and the optimum search is one carried out to the point
where marginal benefit equals marginal cost.56
While recognizing the intuitive plausibility of the assumption
that the costs of the trial are a positive function of the amount of
evidence, I do not think this assumption always holds. Taking
"trial" to mean the factfinding process that yields a legal resolution
of a legal dispute, which I think is consistent with the economic
perspective, the assumption fails because uncovering more evidence may pretermit trial processes that would be more costly than
the pretrial search for additional evidence. To put this more simply, in many cases, the more that is known about what happened,
the greater the chance of a plea bargain or civil settlement. Since
those stages of the trial that involve the presentation of and argument about evidence can be far more expensive than the evidence
gathering stages, the expected cost of a trial will be a diminishing
rather than a positive function of the amount of evidence gathered
whenever the expected savings from the diminished likelihood of
having to present the evidence to a court exceeds the expected
costs of searching for additional evidence. Hence, although Posner's assumption is likely to pertain at the point a trial becomes
inevitable,57 it is wrong to think of total trial costs as increasing always with increasing evidence. Moreover, if appeals and retrials
are considered part of the expected trial cost, which seems consistent with the economic perspective, additional evidence can also
reduce trial costs by reducing the likelihood that an appeal will be

56 Posner, supra note 6, at 1481.

57 Even this may not happen. Accumulated evidence may reduce later trial costs by
leading an opponent to cut out part of her case or by substantially simplifying the

factfinder's task and so lowering the cost of arriving at a verdict.

1642 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 87:1619
taken or, if there is an appeal, that a new trial will be ordered because of trial court errors.

Similarly problematic is the suggestion that as more and more
evidence is obtained, the effect of additional evidence on the outcome of the case will tend to decrease, at least over broad ranges of
acquired evidence.58 Posner recognizes this, as he adds the qualification, "especially if the searcher begins the search with the most

probative evidence, and he introduces a search model developed
by Professor Martin Weitzman which allows information from the
Nth+1 source investigated to be more valuable than evidence

found at the Nth location. However, not only does the Weitzman
model fail to address the issues of evidence accumulation which
Posner's assumptions are intended to capture (a limitation Posner
recognizes), but the model seems ill-suited to trial applications, as
it assumes sources of evidence are independent, in the sense that
discovering valuable evidence from one source does not affect the
chances of acquiring valuable evidence from another. Evidence
searches, however, tend to be just the opposite. An item of evidence often has value not just in what it tells us but also in the
leads it provides to other evidence. Indeed, the latter value may
exceed the former.
With respect to alternative sources of similar evidence, the
Weitzman model counsels us to find an evidence source whose
value exceeds the expected value of the remaining possible sources
and to stop searching once we have found such a source; as Posner
writes, "this means stopping at the first success if each success has

the same evidentiary value."' This economically rational advice
may not, however, be good advice for the lawyer. Consider, for example, a lawyer who needs to prove a particular fact to win a case.
She would be well-advised to find and present the best possible
witness to that fact. But she might also be well-advised to present
other less convincing witnesses to the same fact, because even
though they are not as persuasive as witness number one, their testimony may be crucial in nailing down for the factfinder what the
lawyer must prove. Moreover, the source that is most valuable in

58 Posner, supra note 6, at 1482.
59 Id.

60Id.
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the sense that most observers would be convinced by it may still
leave some observers (one or more jurors) unconvinced, while an
objectively less convincing source may convince observers whom
the former source left unmoved. An economic search model could

be designed to accommodate these circumstances, but why go
through the exercise? What will a lawyer, or scholar for that matter, learn about evidence search strategies that common sense does
not already teach?
Posner's discussion of search issues is not naive or unsophisti-

cated. He recognizes areas of poor fit between what follows from
his models and actual situations at trials. He notes, for example,
that early acquired evidence may reduce the cost of obtaining additional evidence. But recognizing areas of poor fit does not
necessarily make Posner's economic analysis more useful. We encounter here, as in so much law and economics, the general
problem of the second best.6' When the real world does not fit a
model's assumptions, we cannot be certain what the model implies
for action in the real world.62
3. Accurate Factfinding and Deterrence

The second pillar on which Posner's economic approach rests is
the proposition that "[m]ore accurate factfinding increases deterrence of wrongful conduct, which in turn reduces the number of
cases and hence the aggregate costs of the legal process."63 This is
because "greater accuracy in the determination of guilt increases

the returns to being innocent.""4 It is "transparent" according to
Posner's formalization that if punishment is imposed randomly, so
that the probability of punishment is the same regardless of guilt,
the expected punishment cost for committing the crime will be

61 Richard S. Markovits, Second-Best Theory and Law and Economics: An

Introduction, 73 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 3 (1998).
62 The problem arguably is less severe here than in some other areas, for common
sense seems able to perceive many of the areas where the model's assumptions do not
hold and to anticipate adjustments that should be made in figuring real world
implications. Whether these adjustments are in fact adequate is an empirical rather
than a theoretical problem.
63 Posner, supra note 6, at 1483.

64Id.
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zero,65 from which it follows, according to Posner, that the threat of
punishment will have no deterrent effect.66
These propositions, like the "cost of trial" assumptions, are intuitively plausible, but they are mostly wrong, at least in the
unconditional way Posner asserts them. Rather than proving that
accurate factfinding promotes deterrence while randomly inflicted
punishment negates it, the assumptions illustrate the shortcomings
of an axiomatic scheme that, like the macroeconomic approach
Posner advances, ignores the organizational and psychological
elements of social life.
The claim that randomly inflicted punishment cannot deter is
challenged empirically by the choice Nazis and other occupying
powers have sometimes made in punishing crimes against them. In
response to violence against them, these regimes sometimes selected people for execution randomly from among a locale's
inhabitants. If their goal was deterrence, were they employing a
worthless strategy, as Posner's formulas imply? I think not. The
expected punishment cost for those tempted to disrupt the German
occupation, for example, was not just the punishment they would
suffer discounted by its probability of infliction, but also harm to
people they cared about, discounted by its probability of being inflicted. Since the latter probability could be made to approach 100
percent, and since the certainty of punishment has consistently
been shown to be more closely related to deterrence than its sever-

ity,' the deterrent effect of a threat to visit punishment randomly
on a defined population might be substantial, even if there was little chance that the "criminal" would be among those selected for
punishment.

6s Id.

66Id.

67 See Jack P. Gibbs, Crime, Punishment, and Deterrence 105, 117 (1975); Richard
Lempert, Organizing for Deterrence: Lessons from a Study of Child Support, 16 Law
& Soc'y Rev. 513, 516 (1982).
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Occupying armies and those who resist them are in a special relationship, but the threat of punishing randomly within defined
populations might also deter ordinary crimes in ordinary times.
Would-be criminals who might be undeterred by the risk that they

might have to pay a price for a crime might be deterred by the possibility that a parent, child, or friend would be punished for their
crimes. More importantly, neighbors would have incentives to limit
crime by creating anti-crime norms and by turning in criminals,
thus increasing deterrence. Random punishment is, to be sure, abhorrent in free societies to the point of being impermissible, but
this is for reasons of justice and our view of the kind of society we
want to live in, not because it is necessarily unsound from a deter-

rence perspective.'
The limiting case of randomly inflicted punishment illustrates a
blind spot in Posner's economic perspective, but it does not address
the presumed connection between an accurate factfinding process
and deterrence, since random punishment does not require an effort to link defendants to crimes. But even in a world where we
seek to punish only wrongdoers, accurate factfinding does not necessarily maximize deterrence. Posner is not blind to this possibility,
for he recognizes that the possibility of being mistakenly convicted
may cause people with prior records to steer clear of activities that

make them vulnerable to arrest. The point is, however, more general, for it applies not just to those with prior records. Suppose, for
example, that the criminal justice system never makes the mistake
of arresting and convicting for buying or selling those who come
merely to gawk at open air drug markets. There would, under the
economic model, be no incentive for a mere gawker to forego the
pleasure of watching drugs bought and sold. But if it is known that
the police sometimes mistakenly arrest mere gawkers and, even
worse, lie about finding drugs on them, and if it is known that the
courts sometimes convict innocent gawkers, then gawkers have an

,8 Once punishment is confined to a defined population, it is not strictly random, but
all random sampling is random only within defined populations. Posner's deterrence
argument turns on the dilution of a law breaker's perceived threat of punishment
when punishment is random, and substantial dilution occurs even when the
population vulnerable to punishment is relatively small. The core point is that
Posner's microeconomics perspective on the importance of correct verdicts is not
necessarily or always correct, even from his economic perspective.
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incentive to stay away from the scene. Hence, mistaken convictions

can reduce crime because gawking may be a stage on the road to
purchasing or selling, because the presence of large numbers of
gawkers may make it more difficult to spot and arrest sellers and
buyers,69 and because buyers and sellers, seeing that even innocent
gawkers have a chance of being arrested and convicted of drug
dealing, may increase their estimates of their own vulnerability.
Posner also ignores the fact that deterrence is a subjective theory, or, if he is aware of this, implicitly assumes that the objective
probabilities of rightful or wrongful convictions70 coincide, at least
over the long run, with subjective probabilities. This is not necessarily so. As far as deterrence is concerned, the correctness of
particular verdicts matters little in most cases.7' It will not matter
much because those who might be deterred by correct convictions
or encouraged to commit crimes by incorrect ones will seldom be

able to tell if a conviction is correct. The predominance of bargained dispositions on both the criminal and civil side virtually
guarantees ignorance of details. This does not mean that overall
conviction rates or crime clearance rates do not matter for deterrence. They may matter a good deal in giving would-be criminals a
sense of the efficacy of policing and of the willingness of courts to
punish, but whether these rates reflect accurate or mistaken ver69The surest way to ensure that no innocent gawker is wrongfully convicted is, of
course, to arrest no one.

70 Like Posner, I speak here in the language of criminal justice but believe that what
I write extends to the civil justice system as well, although the magnitude of effects
may differ across different areas of law.
71 1 am thinking here of general deterrence, which captures the implications of
punishing A for the future criminality of others. The implications of punishing A for
his own future behavior is called special or specific deterrence. Without empirical
evidence, I find the special deterrence implications of wrongful convictions
indeterminate. Some people following Posner's logic may think that since they are
liable to be punished whether or not they have engaged in crime, they might as well
secure the benefits of crime. Others may think they never want to experience
punishment again and assiduously avoid all situations where they are even suspected
of crime. My hunch is that the latter attitude is more likely to characterize the
wrongfully convicted than the former, so that from a pure deterrence standpoint
wrongful convictions enhance special deterrence. However, I would expect this effect
to be swamped by the criminogenic effects of incarceration and the limits on
legitimate career opportunities ex-convicts face. Hence, even while increasing specific
deterrence, I would expect being wrongfully convicted to increase future crime among
the affected population. These are, of course, guesses about matters that can only be
sorted out by (hard to do) empirical research.
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dicts will be generally unknown. Moreover, to the extent that conviction accuracy is locally known, its deterrence implications are
indeterminate. For example, when a person knows another has
been convicted of a crime he himself committed, it is uncertain
how he will react. A possible reaction is to commit another crime,
emboldened by the fallibility of the system. An equally plausible
reaction is not to test one's luck again, having seen the system's
commitment to punishment. Generally speaking, so long as most
convictions are thought to be accurate, which I believe they are, I
see little reason to think that local knowledge of a few inaccurate
convictions has any important implications for the deterrent effect
of the criminal law.
To the extent that verdicts in specific cases have implications for
deterrence, theory suggests that widely followed cases will be most
important. What is important in these instances, however, is not actual guilt but perceived guilt or innocence. Since the legal system
usually does not convict in publicized cases unless the perception
of guilt is strong, whether a conviction is accurate is likely to have
little to do with its deterrence implications. Some scholarship, for
example, has suggested that Bruno Hauptmann, the alleged kidnapper of the Lindbergh baby,72 and Ethel Rosenberg, the accused

atomic spy,73 were possibly innocent of the crimes for which they
were executed. But even if Hauptmann and Ethel Rosenberg were
innocent, their widespread perceived guilt would have given deterrent force to their punishment.
Posner's case for the relationship between verdict accuracy and
deterrence focuses on what he sees as criminogenic implications of
wrongful convictions. As the returns to innocence diminish, one is
more likely to commit crimes. I believe that I have shown that an
economic analysis which yields this implication considers too few
relevant factors to be trusted. The argument that deterrence requires correct verdicts does, however, seem more plausible when
72See, e.g., Anthony Scaduto, Scapegoat: The Lonesome Death of Bruno Richard
Hauptmann (1976); Robert R. Bryan, The Execution of the Innocent: The Tragedy of
the Hauptmann-Lindbergh and Bigelow Cases, 18 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 831,
833-34 (1991).

73See, e.g., Walter Schneir & Miriam Schneir, Invitation to an Inquest (1965);
Joseph H. Sharlitt, Fatal Error: The Miscarriage of Justice that Sealed the
Rosenberg's Fate (1989) (arguing that the execution of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg
was illegal, regardless of their guilt or innocence).

1648 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 87:1619
cast in the opposite direction. It is reasonable to think that mistaken acquittals may undermine deterrence, perhaps substantially,
even if mistaken convictions do not lessen it or do so to only a
slight degree. A mistaken acquittal, however, will not threaten deterrence unless some facts suggesting guilt are known. Moreover,

to threaten deterrence over the long run, I expect that mistaken
acquittals must regularly occur, at least in particular types of cases
or perhaps in cases involving certain types of people. On the one
hand, I doubt that most people who think O.J. Simpson was wrongfully acquitted of murder are any less deterred by spouse abuse or
homicide laws than they were before the trial, if for no other reason than their knowledge that they could never afford to mount the
kind of defense that Simpson did. On the other hand, I would not
be surprised if the apparent tendencies of prosecutors to refuse to

prosecute and, if charges are filed, of jurors to acquit police officers
accused of using excessive or deadly force has reduced the deterrent force of assault and homicide laws among the police.74 The
same can happen when tendencies to wrongfully acquit in certain
kinds of crimes are known by people attracted to those crimes. Examples in some places and at some times have included drunk

driving,75 gambling violations,76 and certain game law violations.77
Although I think it unlikely that the occasional mistaken acquittal,
even the highly publicized one, has great implications for deterrence,

74 It is not clear whether from an economic perspective this is a good thing or a bad
thing, because accurate enforcement of homicide and other laws against the police
could overdeter in the sense that police intimidated by the prospect of being
convicted of a crime if they are not careful might exercise too much care and avoid
using force in many instances where it would be socially beneficial. The effects of
overdeterrence might outweigh the costs of those wrongful assaults and killings by
police that are not now deterred. Yet, the fact that I can make this argument and that
it sounds sensible within the economic framework will be for many people, including
myself, an argument against applying normative economics to trials. Just because
tolerating injustice is more costly, within the limits of our ability to measure it, than
ignoring or promoting it, does not mean injustice should be tolerated, and sacrificing
innocents for the good of others is intolerable under many philosophical schemes.
See, e.g., Eric Rakowski, Equal Justice 333-67 (1991) (discussing the circumstances, if
any, under which one may sacrifice an innocent to save others).
75 Kalven & Zeisel, supra note 24, at 293-95.
76 Id. at 289-90.
77 Id. at 287-88.
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patterned acquittals suggestive of jury (or judge) nullification will
probably diminish deterrence.78
"Deterrence," Posner tells us, "plays a starring role in the economic
analysis of evidence because it links the concern with accuracy that
is so central to the evidentiary process with the economist's conception of law as a system for creating incentives for efficient conduct."79
If Posner is right, and the viability of the economic approach to law

depends on giving deterrence a starring role, we can leave the economics bandwagon now. If it is deterrence that mediates between
accurate decisions and efficiency, the link is highly problematic, and
an analysis that assumes that verdict accuracy need be the goal in
every case is suspect. Hence, contrary to what Posner says, analyses
that proceed on the assumption that verdict accuracy is a value that
must be maximized in order to maximize efficiency are misguided.
Moreover, although it is plausible to suppose that verdicts in most
cases must be accurate to promote deterrence, it does not follow
that increasing deterrence, and hence law abidingness, will promote efficiency. The link between deterrence and efficiency that
Posner posits assumes that following the law yields efficient outcomes. Many economists would argue, particularly with respect to

many civil regulatory laws, that this is not always so.' There are
similar disputes about the efficiency implications of some criminal

78 More important than acquittals in undermining deterrence may be police failures
to arrest and prosecutorial failures to press charges.
79 Posner, supra note 6, at 1484.
'I See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against
Employment Discrimination Laws 2 (1992) (arguing that antidiscrimination laws are

both unfair and inefficient); Richard Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A
Critique of the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 Yale L.J. 1357, 1357-63 (1983)
(criticizing the inefficiency of labor laws); Steven L. Humphreys, An Enemy of the
People: Prosecuting the Corporate Polluter as a Common Law Criminal, 39 Am. U.
L. Rev. 311, 318-19 (1990) (criticizing the inefficiency of some environmental laws).
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laws,8" and many believe efficiency is no
about the criminal law in the first instance.82
But we need not desert Posner's economic analysis of evidence
law so quickly, even it if it rests on the assumption that there is always value in deciding cases correctly. Although the conclusion
that a true verdict is always a goal does not follow from economics,
we may be able to rest this conclusion on non-economic grounds.
Most obviously it is supported by ideas of justice. We believe people deserve to be convicted of crimes when they are in fact guilty
and not otherwise, to pay damages when they are in fact liable, and
not otherwise, etc. Thus economic analyses that begin from the
proposition that legal rules should promote accuracy are on sound
ground as far as evidence law is concerned, even if they rest on
sand, economically speaking. And the economic perspective offers
more. Even if justice calls for correct results in every case, it is still
important to ask, "At what cost?" While injustice may not be
commensurate with economic costs, it will not automatically trump
them. We could deliver greater justice if we invested more in our
legal system.83 If, for example, DNA tests were done whenever they
might matter, mistaken conviction and acquittal rates would both
be diminished. We might find, however, that before we reached the
point where testing yielded no further justice benefits, the cost of
testing in numerous cases where likely returns were low would, in
most people's minds, exceed the benefits of having a few additional
cases decided correctly.

81 Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Classical and Cross Insider Trading: Variations on
the Theme of Rule lOb-5, 28 Am. Bus. L.J. 109 (1990) (insider trading); Henry G.
Manne, In Defense of Insider Trading, Harv. Bus. Rev., Nov.-Dec. 1966, at 113
(insider trading); Richard H. McAdams, Group Norms, Gossip, and Blackmail, 144
U. Pa. L. Rev. 2237 (1996) (blackmail); Richard A. Posner, The Regulation of the
Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U. L. Rev. 59 (1987) (sale of babies); Lynn A. Stout, The
Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and
Securities Regulation, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 613 (1988) (fraud).
82 Jules L. Coleman, Markets, Morals and the Law 164-65 (1988); Laurence H.
Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98 Harv. L.
Rev. 592 (1985).

83 We might start with giving defendants who face the death penalty funds sufficient
to hire counsel who do not sleep through trials. Burdine v. Johnson, 231 F.3d 950 (5th
Cir. 2000) (holding that prejudice to defendant is not presumed even where defense
counsel slept at some point during court proceedings), rev'd en banc, 262 F.3d 336
(5th Cir. 2001).
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The economic approach Posner advances also ignores legitimacy,
arguably the most important by-product of justice. Indeed, the undercutting of legitimacy, rather than the undercutting of deterrence,
is the likely reason that people are not selected for punishment
more or less at random following crimes. Although research indicates that the procedures for deciding cases are more important
than outcomes to the legitimacy of decisionmaking systems,84 it is
likely that producing correct outcomes is also important, at least
when correct outcomes can be known.
Legitimacy, like deterrence, depends on subjective states of mind,
and, as with deterrence, the link between objective outcomes and
subjective states may be far from tight. Similarly, known errors do
not mean legitimacy will be lost. People know that good faith factfinding will not always get things right. Unlike deterrence, however,
where it is plausible to suppose that known inaccuracies might,
contra Posner, increase deterrent effects, known verdict errors are
unlikely to increase the legal system's legitimacy, except possibly in

those cases in which a law or its enforcement is itself thought illegitimate.
Legitimacy is also like deterrence in that the degree to which it is
threatened by mistaken verdicts is an empirical question. Without
empirical evidence, we cannot estimate the degree to which incorrect verdicts will threaten legitimacy. Hence, if the non-economic

value of justice is ignored, it is difficult to estimate how important
achieving accurate verdicts is to valued ends. Ideas of justice, however, let us assume that correct verdicts are always valuable, even if
their value can be exceeded by their costs.85
Posner recognizes, if not this specific point, something like it in
the alternative cost-minimization model he provides.86 This model
sees the social goal of the evidentiary process as minimizing the

84Casper, supra note 35, at 168, 171; Lind & Tyler, supra note 35, at 66.
85 Justice does not, however, necessarily require verdict accuracy. There are many
conceptions of justice and what it requires. Some conceptions of distributive justice
might justify findings in favor of individuals and against corporate defendants by far
less than a preponderance of the evidence. Dispute about what justice entails can
explain, and in the minds of some people justifies, much jury nullification. What we
can say is that it is the law's internal view that correct verdicts are just ones. The law
makes no assumptions about the relationship between justice and deterrence or
legitimacy.

86 Posner, supra note 6, at 1484.
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sum of the cost of error and the cost of error avoidance. It recognizes that costs can take non-economic forms, including, I assume,

the cost of injustice, although Posner does not mention it.' Posner's analysis is not wrong here, but the point he makes has long
been obvious to evidence scholars. This too is something Posner
realizes. He writes:
The basic insight of [economic] analysis as applied to evidence
law-that the law is engaged in making tradeoffs between accuracy and cost of trials-is also a familiar and even orthodox theme
in noneconomic writing about evidence law. The economic approach serves more to refine and extend them to challenge the

intuition of the legal professional.'

I agree. The approach Posner champions rarely challenges intuitions that have long guided analyses of evidence rules, but in my
view, it also rarely refines or extends them in any useful fashion.
4. Inquisitorial (Judge) vs. Adversarial (Jury) Factfinding
Posner devotes the second portion of his article to the structure

of factual inquiry. He begins this portion contrasting inquisitorial
judge trial systems with adversarial jury trial systems. Although he
identifies areas where he expects judges to do better than juries,
the jury system comes off surprisingly well in the contrast. This is a
contribution, if only because it challenges the notion that economic
approaches to law necessarily yield outcomes that coincide with
corporate interests and conservative political positions.
Posner begins his discussion by constructing two ideal types
("pure systems") of factfinding-an inquisitorial regime of judicial
factfinding and an adversarial system of jury decisionmaking. In
drawing his contrasts, however, Posner ignores the distinction between the ideal and the real, as he draws heavily on empirical

87 The model he presents does not quite fit the trial, for in order for the optimum
describes to exist, increases in the amount of evidence acquired must have a diminishi
effect in reducing the correct decision probability times the stakes. However, through
much of the range over which evidence is collected, the next acquired item of
evidence may have a greater effect than the sum of the earlier acquired evidence in
producing a correct decision. The most familiar example is the uncovering of a socalled "smoking gun," but this will be true whenever earlier acquired evidence is
inadmissible at trial but points the way to admissible evidence.
8 Posner, supra note 6, at 1485.
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research to bolster his conclusions. This is more of a strength than
a weakness. Perhaps because of it, much of what Posner says about

the judge-jury comparison seems correct. Posner discusses the advantages and disadvantages of enduring (judicial) versus ad hoc
(jury) tribunals,89 raises legitimate questions about the quality of

American trial judges,% notes that the trial judge is for some purposes a thirteenth juror who can save the other twelve from error,91
and concludes with a list of recommendations for reforming the

jury system that shows considerable sense.' But most of Posner's
analysis is neither original nor obviously dependent on economic
reasoning.93
Posner also seems on the mark when he suggests that rules of
evidence do not apply or are underenforced in bench trials, less because the rules' protections are superfluous than because there is

no good way to deny judges information that should be excluded.94
His assertions that a competitive system of gathering evidence will
tend to favor the party who would win in an error-free world,95 and
that cross-examination may be more valuable in discouraging the
presentation of weak evidence than in providing a vehicle for de-

stroying witness credibility at trial also ring true.96 But these
propositions, too, are common sense, with the last, in particular,
revealing Posner's creative vision when released from the confines
of the economic box.
Where the economic perspective more directly guides Posner's
analysis, it usually does not take us very far, for the real world implications of economic reasoning are, for the most part, indeterminate.
Perhaps this will change, but to judge by Posner's work, the eco-

89For example, jury trials take longer than bench trials, but jurors bring a fresh
perspective to each case. Id. at 1491, 1494.
90 Id. at 1495-96.

91 Id. at 1493.
92 Id. at 1498-99.

93 I, among others, have reached many of the same conclusions as Posner, and I
made many of the same recommendations some years ago. Conscious reflection on
what economics suggested played no part in my thinking. The same seems true of
most others who have made similar suggestions. See Richard Lempert, Civil Juries
and Complex Cases: Taking Stock after Twelve Years, in Verdict: Assessing the Civil
Jury System 181-247 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
94 Posner, supra note 6, at 1494.
95 Id. at 1492-93.
9 Id. at 1490.
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nomic models currently available are of limited use because they
ignore too many salient facts that condition their implications.
Posner expresses this indeterminacy better than I when he writes:
"It might seem that our searcher-judge would be an extremely effi-

cient searcher .... But maybe not."' A major reason for this
indeterminacy is that in many ways the real world is unlike Posner's ideal types. For example, speaking of the adversarial process,
Posner writes: "Because trial lawyers are compensated directly or
indirectly on the basis of success at trial, their incentive to develop
evidence favorable to their client and to find the flaws in the oppo-

nent's evidence is very great ..... ,98 But, to use Posner's words,
"maybe not;" if an incentive exists, maybe it is so dwarfed by other
incentives and organizational pressures that we can reach no conclusions from its existence.
On the criminal side, both prosecutors and public defenders may
be judged more by their ability to move cases as part of a courtroom "workgroup" than by what happens in the rare cases that go

to trial.' Moreover, in many cases, the state's evidence is largely
what has been developed by the police, while the defense lawyer's
search for evidence begins and ends with leads the defendant provides. Even in death penalty cases, where both the symbolic and
actual stakes are huge, little exonerative evidence may be presented or, indeed, sought out. This may be because a lawyer thinks
the chance of uncovering anything exonerative is small, but it is
more likely because of resource constraints and the fact that, in
some jurisdictions, trial counsel in death penalty cases seem to be
chosen in part because they do not seem strongly motivated to find

flaws in the state's case."? Even on the civil side, where money for
97 Id. at 1488.
98Id. at 1488.

99 James Eisenstein & Herbert Jacob, Felony Justice: An Organizational Analysis of
Criminal Courts 25-26 (1977).

l0See, e.g., Panel Discussion, The Death of Fairness? Counsel Competency and
Due Process in Death Penalty Cases, 31 Hous. L. Rev. 1105, 1198 (1994) (theorizing
that judges subject to reelection who must appear tough on crime may appoint
defense counsel of low quality); Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded
Indigent Defense Services and Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 Buff. L. Rev. 329, 410
(1995) (noting "the disproportionate number of incompetent attorneys assigned to
death cases, the lack of experience and expertise of defense counsel, [and] the
repeated failure of defense attorneys to investigate and present available mitigating
evidence"); Note, The Eighth Amendment and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in
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plaintiffs translates into money for lawyers, there is no guarantee
that the lawyer will be highly motivated to search out evidence. As
Douglas Rosenthal long ago pointed out, lawyers may secure
higher hourly returns by quickly settling cases for smaller sums
than by litigating them successfully for larger sums.'0'
I do not deny that incentives, especially financial ones, affect the
amount of evidence lawyers gather. My examples illustrate this, but
in service of different points than those Posner makes. First, we do
not need the guidance of economists to appreciate how financial
incentives affect lawyer search behaviors. All that is required is
common sense, and nothing Posner writes about incentives to search
out evidence takes us beyond common sense. Second, lawyers' financial incentives are so context-dependent that speculation from
ideal types cannot tell us whether it is the inquisitorial or the adversarial system that is likely to do better at uncovering appropriate
amounts of evidence, even assuming "appropriate" could be operationally defined.
Moreover, even as an intellectual exercise, Posner's microeconomics approach has serious weaknesses for thinking about the
legal system. One weakness is its neglect of organizational variables. The kinds of organizations lawyers work in; the resources
available to them; the way representation is structured; the incentive structures of law firms, states' attorneys' offices, and legal aid
agencies; and courtroom, firm, and agency cultures combine to
shape the kind and extent of evidence searches that lawyers conduct
for their clients. Organizational variables also figure importantly in
inquisitorial systems because inquisitorial judges usually do not
conduct personal searches for evidence but instead are parts of organizational networks that do so. While using party incentives to
explain the scope of evidence gathering makes theoretical sense,
when most incentives are embedded in organizational structures, it
is difficult to foretell how they will play out in actual evidence
searches. A theory that ignores organizations cannot provide accurate

Capital Trials, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1923, 1924 (1994) (noting that "[c]apital defendants
are typically represented by 'the bottom of the bar' at trial").

101 Douglas E. Rosenthal, Lawyer and Client: Who's in Charge? (1974). Jonathan
Harr's A Civil Action presents a sharp picture of why, even when stakes are huge, a
lawyer may be wary of overinvesting in evidence gathering. Jonathan Harr, A Civil
Action (1995).

1656 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 87:1619
answers. One that includes organizations will require considerable
empirical investigation before we can rely on it.102
A more general problem with Posner's focus on lawyers' incentives to gather evidence for trials is that, in most legal cases, the
game is not winning at trial but achieving an acceptable settlement.103 Indeed, it is probably safe to say that most evidence
searches occur with the expectation that a settlement will result.
Hence evidence gathering may be aimed not so much at persuading a jury as it is at determining what a case is worth. Moreover,
gamesmanship-such as signaling the intensity with which one will
fight-may lead a party to favor more rather than less expensive
ways of gathering evidence, particularly if this threatens to impose

non-trivial costs on the other side."0 Thus, contrary to what Posner
suggests,'05 the fact that one party knows that any additional evidence it uncovers can be nullified by evidence the other party
uncovers may not necessarily, even in the economist's world, induce the parties to agree not to seek more evidence. Appearing to
be recklessly unconcerned with costs in a bargaining game can

sometimes be an advantage."'

12 Note that my critique here is specific to the actor-focused macroeconomi
perspective that Posner employs. Organizational variables have long been important
constituents of many theoretical and empirical economic models. See, e.g., such seminal
works as Oliver Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies (1975) (examining the interplay
between organizational structures and market forces), and Mancur Olsen, The Logic
of Collective Action (1971) (noting that group size and ease of communication are
important variables).
103 A survey of 45 large urban general jurisdiction courts reports that 61.5% of all
civil cases were settled or dismissed. Only 3.3% went to trial. Others were disposed of
by summary judgments (3.5%), default judgments (13.5%), transfers (4.5%),
dismissals (11%), or arbitration awards (2.7%). Examining the Work of State Courts,
1996: A National Perspective from the Court Statistics Project 24 (Brian J. Ostrom &
Neal B. Kauder eds., 1997). A survey of criminal filing dispositions in 25 state unified
and general jurisdiction courts found that only 4% of criminal cases proceeded to
trial. Most were disposed of by pleas (63.1%), followed by dismissal or refusal to

continue to prosecute (18.7%), and other (14.2%). Id. at 58; see also Bureau of
Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 1999, at 454 (Ann L.
Pastore & Kathleen Maguire eds., 2000) (indicating that in 1996, 91% of convicted
felons in state courts pled guilty) [hereinafter Sourcebook].
See, e.g., Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics (1986).
105Posner, supra note 6, at 1489.
106 Cf. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Andrew T. Guzman, How Would You Like to Pay
for That? The Strategic Effects of Fee Arrangements on Settlement Terms, 1 Harv.
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According to Posner, the economic perspective also tells us that
"other things being equal, more evidence will be obtained the
closer the case is."'07 This argument objectifies the closeness of legal cases. In a sense, however, no cases are close on the facts, for
facts exist outside of cases and will favor one side or the other."
Cases may appear close on the facts, however, and this appearance
can propel parties to seek more evidence. But whether cases appear close depends on the evidence gathered. Cases are socially
constructed. So Posner's conclusion can be turned around, for
gathering more evidence is often what makes a case close.
Nevertheless, Posner's insight can be reformulated to make
sense. If we think of an event that becomes the focus of a legal case
as throwing off (brute) facts, some of which suggest legal liability
and some of which do not, we can imagine that in some situations
the facts thrown off will overwhelmingly favor one side, while in
others, the factual skew will be less extreme. In one homicide case,
for example, a man may have bought a gun, taken it to a meeting
he arranged with another man, threatened that other man, cursed
him, and then shot him. Several witnesses to each of these events
may be present. A sample of facts from this universe is likely to
strongly favor the state. In another case, two men may have gotten
into a fight, one may have pulled a gun, and the gun might have
discharged, killing one of the fighters. A sample of facts from this
universe may not strongly favor either party. To some witnesses it
may look as if the gun accidentally discharged during the fight,
while other witnesses may be willing to swear that one man
wrested the gun from the other, deliberately aimed, and then fired.
It will be hard to determine the true facts from the evidence available. Yet if we knew the true facts, the proper verdict in this case
might be as clear as it seems in the first example.
Nevertheless, most people would say that the second case is
"closer" than the first one. But whether it is actually closer as a legal case depends on the evidence presented. If in the first case the
prosecutor found and presented only one witness, an eyewitness

Negot. L. Rev. 53 (1996) (discussing the effect of contingency or hourly fee
arrangements on settlement negotiations).
107Posner, supra note 6, at 1489.

108 The legal implications of clear facts may be doubtful, but this is not the concern
here, for Posner is comparing the judge and jury as factflnders.
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who is confident of what he saw but is near-sighted and didn't have
a very good view, and if the defendant presented a plausible alibi,
then that case might seem close on the facts. If in the second case,
the prosecutor presents three witnesses, each of whom testifies that
the defendant wrested the gun from the victim, stood back, aimed,

and fired, and if the defendant in that case testifies that the gun accidentally discharged when they were fighting, the case might not
seem close. In each case, parties will have incentives to get more
evidence. In the first case the incentive will be on the prosecutor to
get more evidence because the case appears close, and in the latter
case, the incentive will be on the defendant to get more evidence
because the case does not appear close. So the apparent conclusion
from economics that case closeness creates incentives to gather
evidence will not always apply in a world where cases are socially
constructed.
What I think does follow, and what I expect Posner means to argue, is that in a case where the easily accessible evidence
predominantly favors one side, evidence gathering will stop with
less evidence collected than in a case where easily accessible evidence appears to cut equally in favor of each party. In the latter
instance, additional, harder to gather evidence is likely to have a
greater marginal pay-off. Thus, in the first example, the prosecutor
in our theoretical world is likely to uncover and call only one of the
available witnesses to each event in the chain, presumably choosing
the best, while in the latter case, each party will attempt to uncover
and call all available supporting witnesses, knowing the other party
will do the same. In the real world, evidence gathering will stop
sooner in the first case than the second, because, unless the defendant has nothing to lose by going to trial, the case is likely to settle.
The second case appears more likely to go to trial, but if both parties are risk averse, it, too, is likely to settle.
Although there may be a greater incentive to search out additional evidence in close cases than in clear ones, it does not follow,
as Posner seems to suggest, that more evidence will be presented to
factfinders in close cases than in clear ones. This is because the cost
side of the equation may swamp the benefit side. If it is quick and
easy to gather evidence, as it often is when the underlying facts are
highly skewed, one would expect a lot of evidence to be gathered,
even if its expected marginal utility is low. If it is difficult and ex-
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pensive to gather evidence, as it may be when the underlying facts
are not highly skewed, parties may not invest in searching out additional evidence, even if any evidence received might have high
marginal utility for them. Hence, it would not be surprising if
courts on average received a higher proportion of the available

brute case facts in clear cases than in close ones. Receipt of a high
proportion of available brute facts may be what makes cases clear.
What may be more likely to distinguish clear from close cases is
not the amount of evidence acquired or a party's willingness to acquire more evidence, but rather the willingness of parties to make

investments in evidence quality. In clear cases, one might expect
that neither party will spend much time preparing witnesses, even
when they are important, but in close cases, considerable witness
preparation may occur.
My suggested refinements of Posner's analysis of incentives and
evidence gathering may strike some as sleeping with the enemy
since there is a strong economic motivation to my argument. To
those who react this way, I make three points. First, economics is
not the enemy; if it helps us better understand evidence law, it is a
friend. Second, making my argument did not require familiarity
with the apparatus of economics, which is a good thing since I am
not an economist. Third, what my analysis required was a view of
how incentives work, awareness of the social constructivist perspective on reality, and some knowledge about organizational and
other factors that can influence searches for evidence. Only the
first type of knowledge is economic in nature, and my need to rely
on it does not extend beyond common sense. When one adds to the
mix the implications of organizational variables and the differential
accessibility of underlying brute case facts, the economic approach
again yields indeterminate solutions. We cannot say whether a
higher proportion of relevant underlying facts will be presented to
tribunals in close cases then in clear ones.
Toward the end of his discussion of the adversarial (jury) and
the inquisitorial (judge) systems, Posner attributes the apparent
conscientiousness of juries who have "no career stakes in doing

their job as jurors well"'" and a "financial incentive to conduct a

109 Posner, supra note 6, at 1497.
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careful sifting of the evidence [that] is nil""10 largely to the theatrics
of trial by jury. Posner's slighting of altruistic motives,"' ideological
commitments, pride in doing a job well, and the social pressure to
contribute to group products illustrates the tendency of the economic perspective to limit vision. Even more interesting is Posner's
claim that attributing motivational effect to the drama of jury decisionmaking "is no more (or less) surprising from the standpoint of
rational choice than the fact that an audience can be frightened by
a scary movie even though everyone knows that it is makebelieve.""12
It is easy to dispute the analogy, for the movie audience is responding to a stimulus designed to bypass cognitive screens and
play on emotions, while trial lawyers, even if they might sometimes
wish to arouse emotion, are generally appealing to cognitive reasoning. Moreover, not much turns on whether movie audiences are
aroused by scary flicks except enjoyment, and little work is involved in watching a film. Jurors, by contrast, realize that much
may turn on what they decide, paying attention as a juror requires

work,"3 and deliberating can be difficult and even unpleasant, especially if one has a minority view.
But these are quibbles. What is important is that to anyone but

an economist (and a few political scientists), there is no puzzle
here. The fact that jurors perform well in the absence of financial
incentives or career stakes is not surprising. Rather it suggests the
limits of a rational choice model that privileges economic values in
understanding trial systems. While rational choice models that employ largely economic variables help explain considerable legal

behavior (for example, decisions to sue or civil settlements), they
have no general explanatory value over much of the terrain Posner
investigates. Rather, they constrict vision and draw attention from

non-economic explanatory variables."4 This does not mean rational

Id.
"I Although Posner notes that jurors are screened for conscientiousness, this is the
less important element for him, and he never tells us why people should be conscientious.
Id.
112 Id.

113 It is here that the drama of a trial-if it is dramatic-may ease the burden.
114 In principle, an economic model can incorporate any variable it can recognize as
a benefit or a cost. See Kaplow and Shavell, supra note 36. But many such variables
are difficult if not impossible to operationalize, and in practice, the rational choice
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choice models cannot be expanded to explain various aspects of
trials, but when they are, they lose the power they have to make
sense of some kinds of actions and decisions. When involvement in
the trial drama must be given pride of place in a rational choice
model of jury conscientiousness with no empirical evidence that
this is more important than a sense of civic duty or the fact that
there is intrinsic satisfaction in doing a job well, we have reason to

question the model's utility. Not only is there no strong reason to
believe that drama has the importance Posner attributes to it, but
the need to posit such a variable suggests a gap in understanding
that rational choice economics does not fill in.
I could quarrel with other aspects of Posner's comparison of the
inquisitorial and adversarial systems, but I think I have written
enough to explain why, on the one hand, I do not think economics

does much to advance our understanding of the issues Posner addresses. On the other hand, empirical research, which Posner often
draws on, careful observation, like that reflected in the more nuanced of Posner's analyses, and common sense, which Posner also
employs, do advance the discussion, even if there remains much to
learn.

B. Weighing Evidence
1. Burdens of Proof
The next portion of Posner's paper examines evidentiary rules,

beginning with burdens of proof. Posner's discussion of the production burden is a good example of an evidentiary rule that makes
economic sense. As Posner points out, it is usually good economics
to have the production burden aligned with the persuasion burden.

Since the plaintiff (whom we will assume is the party with the permodels of economics, like all models, privilege some variables over others. Economic
models also tend to ignore limits on rational thinking like cognitive illusions, although

this too is not entailed by a rational choice perspective. What is inherent, however, is
that human thought is not always rational in the way rational choice models imply,
and such thought processes cannot be captured by these models. Also, a macroeconomic
orientation is not very useful in comprehending the production of certain public goodslike justice. See Elizabeth Anderson, Unstrapping the Straightjacket of 'Preference':
A Comment on Amartya Sen's Contributions to Philosophy and Economics, 17 Econ.
& Phil. 21, 25-32 (2001); Elizabeth Anderson, Should Feminists Reject Rational

Choice Theory?, Paper presented at the Conference on Social Norms, Social Meaning,
and the Economic Analysis of Law, Chicago (1997).

1662 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 87:1619
suasion burden) will lose if she cannot establish a prima facie case,
there is no point in forcing a defendant to pay the costs of presenting
evidence unless such a case can be established. There is, however, a
puzzle here that Posner does not pursue. If the rational actor model

fits the trial, why should it matter who has the production burden? A
rational plaintiff would not bring suit if she knew she would lose
even if the defendant presented no evidence. Some answers are

possible. One is that a plaintiff may think her evidence establishes
a prima facie case when it does not. Another is that if the production burden were on defendants, the nuisance value of suits would
rise.

There are similar reasons for not placing the production burden
on plaintiffs with respect to a defendant's affirmative defenses, and
as Posner notes, even stronger reasons for not requiring a plaintiff
to negate possible affirmative defenses as part of her case-in-chief.

The latter would expend court and party resources to refute claims
the defendant might not make and so would unnecessarily raise the

costs of bringing suit."' There is similar economic sense, as Posner
points out, to rules like the McDonnell Douglas"16 rule, which shift
the production burden when a plaintiff has presented certain circumstantial evidence consistent with his claim and the defendant is
well positioned to refute any misleading implications of that evidence.

In short, the rules regarding burdens of proof make considerable

economic sense,117 but special knowledge of economics is not
needed to see the sense in them."18 Moreover, to show that burden

"'The law is not completely or consistently rational in this way. To make out a
prima facie case, the plaintiff or prosecution may have to prove matters the defense
does not intend to dispute. In civil cases, these costs may be minimized by the use of
stipulations and requests for admission. In criminal cases, only the former are available,
and a prosecutor who could save costs by entering a stipulation may refuse for tactical
reasons.

116 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
117 E.g., Thomas R. Lee, Pleading and Proof: The Economics of Legal Burdens, 1997
BYU L. Rev. 1; Bruce L. Hay, Allocating the Burden of Proof, 72 Ind. L.J. 651
(1997).
118 Views that attend to efficiency considerations can be found in such classic
comments on the burden of proof as Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law 85
(Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Belknap Press of Harv. Univ. Press 1963) (1881), and
Edward W. Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An Essay on Juristic Immaturity, 12
Stan. L. Rev. 5,12-14 (1959).
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of proof rules make sense is not to show an economic motif that rationalizes the rules of evidence. There is, for example, no McDonnell
Douglas principle that shifts production burdens whenever evidence needed to resolve an issue is more easily accessed by the
defendant than by the plaintiff. Indeed some rules, like the Fifth
Amendment, exist in defiance of what economics might see as efficient trial practice. We should not be surprised that trial procedures
often make good sense economically, but we should not think this
is the whole, or even the most important part, of the story.
Posner's attempt to explain the legal norms surrounding burdens
of proof using an economic framework seems especially problematic when he shifts his attention from the production burden to the
burden of persuasion and, in particular, to the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard that applies in criminal cases. Posner gives
two justifications for this high burden. The first is an efficiency justifi-

cation: "[T]he cost to an innocent defendant of criminal punishmen
may well exceed the social benefit of one more conviction of a

guilty person.""'9 So it may, but it also may not. We do not know,
priori. Moreover, the cost to a guilty defendant of criminal punishment may also exceed the social benefit of one more conviction.
Indeed, it is difficult to see why convictions cost guilty persons

more than they cost innocent ones.'20 With respect to the social
benefits of general deterrence, so long as those convicted are
thought guilty by most observers, actual guilt should not matter.12'
The one area where the social benefit from correct convictions
seems, on average, clearly to exceed that from wrongful convictions is in the specific deterrent and incapacitative effects of
criminal convictions. Taking guilty defendants off the streets is
likely to stop them from committing future crimes, and this outcome perhaps justifies the costs of the trial and incarceration.

"9Posner, supra note 6, at 1504.
120 Perhaps on average the opportunity costs of criminal convictions to innocen
people will be greater than they are to guilty people, because innocent people have
better job prospects. Innocent people wrongfully caught up in the criminal justice
system, however, are often people whose prospects for substantial market success are
slim. This may be why they are suspected criminals. Also, the opportunity costs of
being unable to commit more crimes may exceed the costs of being unable to work at
a legal job. But for good reasons we are unwilling to recognize the former as costs,
even if the additional crimes would not raise costs for others.
121 See discussion supra note 71.
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Removing innocent defendants from the streets is less likely to
have crime reduction effects. But it would be sheer coincidence if
the differential benefit in special deterrence mirrored the tradeoff
wrought by the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. Indeed, as

Posner recognizes,'22 no particular tradeoff is implicit in the standard because it depends on the proportions of guilty and innocent
defendants among those tried for crimes.123 Furthermore, we do not
adjust the criminal burden of proof based on likely sanctions, although sanctions largely determine the costs paid by convicted
defendants. Nor do we adjust the burden to track the benefits to

society of correct convictions.'24 We do not, for example, decrease
the government's burden of proof when it prosecutes highly publicized cases, even if convictions in these cases are likely to have
substantially greater deterrent effects than convictions of unknown
people for run-of-the-mill crimes. In short, if there is an economic
logic to the burden of proof in criminal cases, this strand of Posner's argument does not capture it.
Posner's other economic justification for the higher burden in
criminal than in civil cases is similarly weak. Posner argues that the
prosecution has an inherent resource advantage in criminal cases,125
and with a lower standard they could allocate those resources to
put especially heavy pressure on defendants who choose to fight. It
is true that the prosecution has an inherent resource advantage
over most criminal defendants; but often in civil cases, one side or
the other has an equally substantial resource advantage, and no
compensatory change in the burden of proof follows. Indeed, there
is not even a right to appointed counsel in civil cases, whatever the
imbalance. Moreover, the suggestion that the government will exploit its advantage across cases to "wallop the occasional defendant

122 Posner, supra note 6, at 1506.

123 Michael L. DeKay, The Difference Between Blackstone-Like Error Ratios and
Probabilistic Standards of Proof, 21 Law & Soc. Inquiry 95, 119 (1996).
124For example, a conviction for a crime like drug dealing may bring little in the way
of deterrence because so many people are convicted of dealing that an additional
conviction has little marginal value. Yet the penalty is often quite heavy. A conviction
of price fixing or insider trading may have a substantial deterrent impact because it
shows the government is willing to enforce the law. Yet sentences may be relatively
light. In prosecuting both crimes the government will have to prove its case by what is
in theory the same beyond a reasonable doubt standard.
125 Posner, supra note 6, at 1505.
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who does invoke his right to a trial"'126 is seldom likely to be true.
Usually the prosecution's case is made by the police or by prosecutorial investigators who develop the evidence needed to arrest.
Thus, by the time of trial, many of the prosecution's evidence
search costs are sunk, even if evidence presentation has additional
costs. The prime incentive defendants have to plead guilty is not
that if they go to trial the government will allocate resources they
have husbanded in order to get them, but rather that guilty defendants know they are guilty, know that their cases are likely to be
weak because the truth is against them, and know that they will get
stiffer sentences if they go to trial rather than plead.
Not only are the economic rationales for the beyond a reasonable doubt standard in criminal cases weak ones, they are not
needed to explain it. There are obvious non-economic reasons why
we adopt this standard in criminal cases. In particular, the standard
expresses an aspiration to never convict innocent people and a
moral judgment about the wrongfulness of inflicting the pain of
criminal conviction on people who are not guilty of crimes. The
prosecutorial resource advantage noted by Posner may play a role,
but not because (to use his analogy) a lower standard would make
it rational for the prosecution to reallocate resources in the same
way predatory pricing can be a rational strategy when there is un-

equal access to capital markets.127 Rather, fairness is an important
value in the justice system, and given that the state can usually be

expected to have power, moral, and other advantages, the high
criminal burden of proof seems like a fair means to correct the balance.

The standard can also be defended on Kantian-type grounds:
The freedom of innocent people should not be abrogated as a
means to ensure that no guilty people escape punishment. Alternatively, people behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance would want a
high burden of proof in criminal cases because they would expect
to be among the large majority of innocent people; therefore, given
risk aversion, they would want to ensure that they were not wrongly
convicted of crimes. Once the veil was lifted, they might face a potentially substantial risk of wrongful conviction if the burden of

126 Id.

127 Id.
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proof in criminal cases were too low. Taking a more sociological
perspective, the legal system's legitimacy might be destroyed by
too many wrongful convictions. Cultural and historical circumstances also help explain this standard.129 Finally, the standard does
not seem to pose great problems. Plea bargain rates of ninety percent and higher are common in criminal courts,130 and among those
who go to trial, most are convicted.131 Moreover, prosecutors do not
complain of their burden and rarely speak of cases they might
bring were their burden lower. In short, there are many ways to
explain the origin and persistence of the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard in criminal cases; economic arguments are not needed to
explain it and add little or nothing to our understanding of why the
standard exists.
Economic variables, considered in the way economists think
about them, help make sense of the production burden aspect of

the burden of proof, even if the considerations they highlight have
long been part of evidence law's common sense. These same variables and modes of thought contribute little if anything to
understanding the burden of persuasion aspect of the burden of
proof, at least as it applies in criminal cases. Posner, however, must
argue for an economic justification to support his suggestion that a
general economic motif unifies the law of evidence. For me, the
criminal burden of proof, and the failure of economics to explain it,
makes the opposite point. Even if some evidence rules are consistent with economic rationality and tend toward the efficient,

128 For the first time since the 1960s, support for the death penalty in this country
diminishing. There is some reason to believe that a major factor in this change of
opinion is that DNA evidence has demonstrated that a number of people on death
row did not commit the crimes of which they were convicted. The Illinois moratorium
on the death penalty is the most striking indicator of the effect of information about
wrongful convictions. Sam Gross & Phoebe Ellsworth, Second Thoughts: Americans'
Views on the Death Penalty at the Turn of the Century, in The Modem Machinery of
Death, The Future of Capital Punishment in America (Stephen P. Garvey ed.,
forthcoming 2001).

129Barbara J. Shapiro, "Beyond Reasonable Doubt" and "Probable Cause": Historical
Perspectives on the Anglo-American Law of Evidence 1-41 (1991) (tracing the
development of the reasonable doubt standard).
130In 1996, 91% of felons convicted in state courts pled guilty. See Sourcebook,
supra note 103, at 454.

131 Kalven & Zeisel, supra note 24, at 20 (noting that acquittal rates range from 1451%, depending on the crime); Sourcebook, supra note 103, at 460 (listing a total
conviction rate of 70%).
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economic principles leave much about the law of evidence unex-

plained-too much to support the claim that an economic spine
runs through the law of evidence or that the economic perspective
provides a unique understanding of evidence law.132
2. Naked Statistical Evidence

Posner next turns his attention to statistical evidence. He presents
his perspective on the famous blue bus/green bus hypothetical and
his justification for the strong intuition that, even though the civil
burden of proof is a preponderance of the evidence, a person hit by
a bus he cannot identify cannot successfully sue the Blue Bus
Company simply by showing that fifty-one percent of a town's buses
are blue.133 Although some of Posner's arguments are familiar, such
as his questioning of the implicit assumption that the only available

evidence is statistical,'34 he introduces two interesting and original
arguments that support the intuition where it seems most questionable: (1) when the plaintiff has either not investigated the accident
beyond collecting statistics or (2) when the statistical evidence is all

that is available even after extensive investigation.'35 In the first
situation, Posner argues, society can demand that the plaintiff investigate further, because the state contributes resources to trials
and will get no deterrence returns if it turns out that the bus that

hit the plaintiff was green.'36 Hence, before the state expends resources on the plaintiff's case, the plaintiff can be required to do
132 I do think highlighting the tradeoff between Type I and II error as Posner does
clearly captures much of what is at stake in setting a particular persuasion burden.
Posner, supra note 6, at 1504-05. These concepts are not economic, however, but
statistical, and one does not need to be aware of these labels or how they are used in
statistics to realize that a standard that makes it more likely that innocent defendants
will go free will also free more guilty ones and vice versa.
133 The hypothetical involves a person hit by a bus on a road where 51 % of the buses
that pass by at random times during a day are blue and owned by the Blue Bus
Company, and 49% are green and owned by the Green Bus Company. Although the
plaintiff can present convincing evidence of negligence, she does not know the color
of the bus that hit her and sues the Blue Bus Company because, given the information
she has, their market shares make it more likely than not that a blue bus hit her. The
hypothetical problem was inspired by an actual case, Smith v. Rapid City Transit, Inc.,
58 N.E.2d 754 (Mass. 1945).
l See David Kaye, Naked Statistical Evidence, 89 Yale L.J. 601 (1980); Lempert,
supra note 13.

13 Posner, supra note 6, at 1509.
136Id.
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enough of an investigation to make it likely that the state's invest-

ment of judicial resources will be worthwhile.'37
Yet more helpful is Posner's contribution to thinking about the
hardest problem in this area: the situation where the statistical evi-

dence is all that can be found, and more correct than incorrect
decisions would be achieved in the long run by deciding on the basis of naked statistics. Suppose, for example, that fifty-one percent
of the buses in town were blue. If the plaintiff prevailed in one
thousand cases where only statistical evidence was available, 510
verdicts could be expected to be correct. This means twenty more
cases would be decided correctly than if the evidence was not allowed and the defendant won each case. Posner points out that the
gain of twenty correct decisions over the no trial status quo would
be unlikely to equal the social costs of trying the thousand cases
necessary to achieve these gains.
Posner's argument valuably advances thinking about this classic
problem, because it shows that intuitions about the inadequacy of
naked statistical evidence do not necessarily conflict with rational
actor models of legal decisionmaking. It also shows the value of
tracing out the social cost implications of legal activity. Here the
economic perspective draws attention both to social costs, which
importantly include the costs of the tribunal, and benefits.
Nevertheless, Posner's analysis leaves many issues open. First, it
does not tell us why the intuition that naked statistical evidence is
inadequate persists when higher proportions of the buses that might

have caused the accident, say seventy-five percent, are blue."38 Posner's response that with a greater statistical imbalance, the statistics
should perhaps be enough is, however, a fair one. There is no rea-

son why economic thinking need support our intuitions to be

13,The requirement of an investigation that goes beyond statistics also diminishes
the dissipation of judicial resources in nuisance litigation. A plaintiff who has suffered
a low stakes injury, or any injury through his own fault, might sue the Blue Bus
Company, asking for less than the cost to the company of refuting his prima facie
case-if statistics were sufficient to establish it. Hence, settling would cost Blue Bus
less than defending. The expenditure of court resources in such settlements may be
small, but there would be some cost, and, more importantly, suing for nuisance value
is inefficient and unjust.
138 Ronald J. Allen, A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, 66 B.U. L. Rev. 401, 42830 & n.67 (1986); Gary L. Wells, Naked Statistical Evidence of Liability: Is Subjective
Probability Enough?, 62 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 739, 739-40 (1992).
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helpful; often it is most helpful when it challenges them. If seventyfive percent of the buses that might have caused an accident are
blue, and if it is impossible to provide more than statistical evidence, then perhaps the Blue Bus Company should pay every time.
Second, Posner ignores justice as a reason why courts should invest
in resolving disputes. As between the parties, the compensation
decision is a transfer payment, and its resolution has no necessary
social welfare implications. Posner's apparent assumption that investing judicial resources makes sense only to the extent that
significant social benefits, like deterrence, will result is mistaken to
the extent that it does not treat justice between the parties, regardless
of its efficiency implications, as a benefit. Indeed, ideas of justice
probably explain why many regard naked statistical evidence as in-

sufficient to justify imposing liability on the Blue Bus Company,
even when trial costs are low and seventy-five percent of the town's

buses are blue. In matters of justice, people ordinarily do not think
statistically. They see justice not as a phenomenon to be maximized
over the long run, but as an ideal to be realized in each case. If a
bus company is to be punished, it should be for what its driver did
and not for having more buses on the road than its competition.

With naked statistics, it seems as if the bus company is being punished for its dominant position. Hence, the situation in which
seventy-five percent of the buses in town are blue differs from the

situation where there are an equal number of blue and green buses
in town, and a witness who is judged to have a seventy-five percent
chance of being right testifies that the bus that hit the plaintiff was
blue. In the latter instance, the jurors feel they are punishing the
Blue Bus Company for what one of its bus drivers did, even if they
feel there is a twenty-five percent chance they have gotten the cul-

prit company's identity wrong.'39 As psychologists have known for

139The legal inferiority of naked statistical evidence is seen as manifested by the fact
that a case will not be allowed to go to a jury on the basis of naked statistical evidence
when it would be allowed to go to the jury on the basis of witness testimony that is no
more likely to identify the true culprit than the statistical evidence. I think the claim
that this shows the law disfavors statistical evidence confuses the possible probative
value of the evidence with the weight a jury will give it. In the case of naked statistical
evidence these probabilities are presumptively the same. If 51% of the buses are blue
and this is all the evidence that can reasonably be uncovered, the jury would be
unreasonable to conclude that the probability that the Blue Bus Company is responsible
for an accident is anything other than 51%. In the case of the fallible witness, it may
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some time," but mainstream economists h
to realize, how an issue is framed for cognitive processing has pre-

dictable effects on the conclusions people reach."1' Naked statistical
evidence and witness causal testimony are likely to be framed differently, even if they implicate the Blue Bus Company in the accident
with the same probability.
It is also important to note that our unwillingness to allow jurors
to decide issues on statistics alone, and the likely reluctance of jurors to base liability decisions on less than overwhelming statistical

evidence,'42 has exceptions. One of the factors that drives our intuition in the blue bus hypothetical is that even if we can
hypothetically consider the implications of disallowing this evidence in a thousand cases, we know that we will not in our
lifetimes encounter a thousand accidents in which statistics are the
only evidence tending to show which company's bus is responsible.
We would not encounter that many cases if we lived to be a thousand years old. If, however, thousands of cases arose every year in
which unknown buses injured passengers, the matter would come
to be framed differently, and I expect we would let statistical market share information justify assignments of responsibility. This is
in fact what has happened in areas where market share liability is
accepted.143 Large numbers of cases allow for a refraining of the issue
so that what matters is not whether some company is responsible
for a certain injury but rather what share of a large number of injuries
a given company is likely to have caused. Naked statistics, although
they do not link companies to specific injuries, do not offend most
people's intuition when used this way, because although particular
be that the jury ultimately concludes that there is a 51% chance that she is right, but
when the evidence was presented in court there was almost certainly a range of
probabilities that could reasonably be attached to the testimony. If there were not-if,
for example, a witness testified that she was quite uncertain what the bus color was,
that it may have been green or it may have been blue, but she leans slightly toward
thinking it was blue-a judge might well direct a verdict for the Blue Bus Company
holding that a jury verdict against Blue Bus would be based solely on speculation.
140 See Richard Nisbett & Lee Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings
of Social Judgment (1980).

141 See Jolls et al., supra note 46, at 1546.
142 See Wells, supra note 138.
143 See, e.g., David M. Schultz, Market Share Liability in DES Cases: The Unwarranted
Erosion of Causation in Fact, 40 DePaul L. Rev. 771 (1991) (discussing the use of

market share liability in diethylstilbestrol ("DES") cases); Aaron D. Twerski, Market
Share-A Tale of Two Centuries, 55 Brook. L. Rev. 869 (1989) (same).
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companies cannot be linked causally to particular injuries, each com-

pany appears to be paying in proportion to the damage it has caused.
I have noted how, in his analysis of naked statistical evidence, Posner's economic perspective has helped him make a contribution to
the literature on evidence law that is original and neither obvious
nor common sense. His discussion of naked statistical evidence,
however, also illustrates how the reductionism of economics can

lead one to push an argument to the point of silliness. As a final
justification for judicial hostility to naked statistical evidence, Posner tells us that if Company A is always held liable for accidents,
almost half of which are caused by Company B, then:
A will have a big incentive to be careful and B little or no incentive to be careful. As a result, over time, more than half the
accidents will be caused by B, increasing the error rate resulting
from allowing juries to base decisions on the ratio of the com-

panies' buses on the route in question. Eventually, A, having
higher liability costs, will probably withdraw from the route; the

rules on burden of proof will have created a monopoly!'44
The exclamation point at the end is Posner's, and it certainly
should be there, unless perhaps it should be replaced by the glyph,

":-)". Surely Posner is joking, for the argument is bad economics
and even worse behavioral science.
First, the incentive on Company A to be careful will be no
greater than if it were not responsible for B's accidents, for A's

care will do nothing to prevent B from being involved in accidents,
for which A will be held responsible. Second, B's incentive to take
care would in practice hardly diminish, because most bus accidents
would not leave only statistical evidence in their wake. Third, if
over time more than half the accidents were caused by Company
B, A might reasonably argue that the proper statistical base was
the proportion of accidents caused, not the proportion of buses on
the road, and B might find that it, not A, was paying for all unattributable accidents. Fourth, assuming bus prevalence statistics were
to control and that they were all the evidence available in many accidents, A's rational response would not be to drop the route
(assuming it were otherwise profitable), but rather to reduce the
number of buses it sent out to the same number sent out by B. That
144Posner, supra note 6, at 1510.

1672 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 87:1619
way neither company would have to pay for unattributable accidents, the lower cost would mean that each company could afford

to put an additional equal number of buses on the road,'45 and bus
service would improve!
This conclusion too would be a joke if I meant it as more than a
refutation of Posner's analysis. I offer it, however, to show potential drawbacks of the economic perspective. One wrapped up in
this perspective can easily push it too far, neglecting the unreality
of assumptions and drawing attention from sounder arguments. In
some measure, tracing out the implications of economics for evidence law is a game, and I suppose there is nothing wrong in
engaging in it just for fun. But when one does, both positive and
normative payoffs are likely to be nil. Nevertheless, the temptation
to think the results of the game should inform policy may be great,
and policymakers are all too willing to use questionable research to
justify policies they favor on other grounds.146
3. Other Statistical Evidence

When Posner turns to statistical evidence in general, he gets
some things right and some things wrong. If I may be pardoned for
accentuating the negative, I will only discuss the latter. Specifically,
I have difficulties with his suggestion that the higher the significance level, the more reliable a study is as evidence,'47 and I think
he is wrong when he suggests that the time needed to explain a

study's design at trial increases with diminishing robustness."
Significance tests deal with one concern: whether it is plausible
to suppose that an identified relationship results from chance

145 This assumes that B was not sending out an optimum number of buses fr

perspective apart from liability considerations, a likely assumption since a major benef
from keeping the number of its buses down was avoiding liability in unattributable
accident cases.
146 a recent example consider how projections of surpluses for the next decade
were used to justify the 2001 Bush tax cut, although few economists would claim that
they could accurately project budget surpluses ten years into the future.

147 Posner, supra note 6, at 1511.

1481n a certain sense, this is a truism, for robustness can mean that the results of an
analysis are not threatened by the violation of certain assumptions. But Posner does
not seem to be using the term this way. Rather, he seems to associate robustness with
greater statistical significance. What I quarrel with is his suggestion that the greater
the significance level reached, the less need there is to explore issues of study design.
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rather than from the specific reasons the study's proponent pro-

poses. The most likely reason for a low significance level'49 is that a
hypothesized relationship does not exist. Some of the model building problems Posner sees as possible reasons for low significance,
such as the omission of relevant variables,'50 can increase the apparent statistical significance of a variable rather than lower it.

More importantly, levels of statistical significance depend not only
on the strength of relationships, but also on the number of cases
considered and the distribution of values on different variables.
For most legal purposes, the strength of apparent relationships is
more important than significance levels. Usually it will matter little
if a significance level is .01 rather than .001, for in either case, if the
model is correctly specified, the results are unlikely to reflect a
chance relationship. Although it may vary with the legal issue, a
strong relationship that is significant at the .01 level will almost always merit more evidentiary weight than a weaker relationship
significant at the .001 level. More generally, contrary to what Posner seems to suggest, when relationships are statistically significant,
it is a mistake to look primarily to significance levels to assess the
value of evidence. I expect Posner knows this and so am puzzled as
to why he writes as if levels of statistical significance were a good
test of relative evidentiary value.
I am also puzzled by Posner's claim that the weaker the statisti-

cal evidence, "the more time will have to be spent at trial exploring
the design of the study."'' This strikes me as often wrong. If statistical evidence is weak because it is not significant, it carries
consumer warning. One does not have to probe the study
sign flaws that will undercut its apparent implications. On
hand, when statistical evidence seems strong, one wants to

its own
for dethe one
be sure
that the apparent strength does not result from the exclusion of
important variables, from model building aimed at establishing a
significant relationship rather than at fairly testing a null hypothe-

149 I am following Posner and using low significance levels to refer to relationships
that are not highly significant. In fact, statistical significance increases as the
significance level grows smaller. Thus a relationship significant at the .01 level is less
likely to be attributable to chance than a relationship significant at the .05 level, and
the latter relationship is less likely to be due to chance than a relationship significant
at the .10 level.

'IOPosner, supra note 6, at 1511.
15 Id. at 1512.
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sis, or from a study design that was intentionally or unintentionally
biased in favor of finding a strong relationship. On the other hand,
if a model is offered to show the absence of a relationship, and evidence for its absence is found in weak or statistically insignificant
relationships, then the study design and model construction must

be closely studied to ensure that neither is biased against finding
associations that in fact exist. The bottom line is that when statistical studies are presented, design and model building issues should
be probed to ensure that the study's results, whether manifested by
significant or insignificant relationships, can reasonably be relied
upon.152

C. The Federal Rules of Evidence
It is not until the third section of his paper, more than halfway
through, that Posner turns to the stuff of most evidence courses,
the Federal Rules of Evidence. What one finds is by now familiar.
Some of what the economic perspective suggests is misguided, and
much of the rest is already understood as a matter of common
sense.

152 1 have little to say about two other topics Posner discusses under the rubric
Burden of Proof: the product rule and biased factfinders. I think Posner's discussion
of the product rule is quite sensible, but like my colleague Rick Friedman, I disagree
with Posner's claim that a factfinder who is free from bias approaches a case, whether
civil or criminal, with prior odds of 1:1. Professor Friedman, in my view, persuasively
refutes Posner's claims on this score. See Richard D. Friedman, A Presumption of
Innocence, Not of Even Odds, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 873, 873-74 (2000) (arguing that Posner's
view of the unbiased factfinder is wrong in principle and as a matter of probability
theory). I also do not think Posner's analysis has anything to say about the desirability
of peremptory challenges. While I agree a jury's diversity contributes importantly to
its strengths, strong biases can interfere with the rational factfinding we seek. So long
as trial judges refuse to dismiss jurors who say they can be fair despite a strong
likelihood the jurors are biased, the availability of peremptory challenges is likely to

enhance the accuracy of jury factfinding and the quality of jury justice. See Barbara
Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power," 27 Stan. L. Rev. 545,
553-54 (1975); Richard Lempert, Jury Size and the Peremptory Challenge: Testimony
on Jury Reform, 22 L. Quadrangle Notes 8, 12 (1978). Posner's mistake here is that he
considers only one aspect of the issue and reaches normative conclusions based on
what that aspect implies. This is particularly unwise when what is considered is an

abstract proposition rather than the real world workings of a complex institution.
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1. Harmless Error
Posner begins his discussion with Federal Rule 103, the harmless

error rule. Despite its presence in the Federal Rules, Rule 103 is
not a rule of evidence. Rather it is an instruction to judges that
provides that errors in admitting or excluding evidence that do not
affect substantial rights of parties cannot justify motions for new
trials or reversals on appeal. Posner makes an interesting, and to
my knowledge original, attack on the harmless error rule. He
points out that an appellate court, not seeing the jury, will regard
each jury as average in its propensity to convict. A prosecutor,
however, may realize that the jury she is arguing to is more acquittal
prone than average and may opportunistically offer impermissible

evidence or object to the defendant's admissible evidence, knowing
first that if the trial judge rules mistakenly in her favor it may sway
this jury's verdict, and second, that a resulting conviction will
probably be sustained on appeal. This result may occur because the
appellate court, thinking of an average jury, will believe the evidentiary mistake had no effect on the verdict.'53
The problem with the argument is that, although it makes sense
in the abstract, there is little reason to believe prosecutors or
judges act as Posner's model assumes. To the extent prosecutors
intentionally seek improper evidentiary advantages, it is probably
because they realize that without them, almost any jury would find
their case weak. They also know that even if an average jury would
be swayed by the error, an average appellate judge will find a way

to ignore this.154 As Posner observes, "it takes a highly disciplined
judge to vote to reverse a conviction when he thinks the defendant
is guilty," even if he acknowledges the error is not harmless155 and
even if, I would add, what convinces him of the defendant's factual
guilt is the inadmissible evidence.

153Posner, supra note 6, at 1518. Posner also offers a formal treatment of this
argument, but I think it adds little to the verbal formulation. I also think it contains a
mistake, as the cost of the original trial is not included as a cost in the state of the
world where a conviction is followed by a retrial. I do not believe this mistake is
consequential at the model's level of abstraction.

154Thomas Y. Davies, Affirmed: A Study of Criminal Appeals and Decision-Making
Norms in a California Court of Appeal, 1982 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 543, 586.
155 Posner, supra note 6, at 1518.
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I also quarrel with Posner's assumption that the harmless error
rule ordinarily works to "head off remands that would be all costs

and no benefits."'56 This claim ignores the benefits of increasing doctrinal clarity,'57 deterring prosecutorial misconduct and hence reducing
the cost of cases reversed for errors that are not harmless,158 and
promoting procedural justice. Posner concludes his discussion of
harmless error by suggesting that errors deliberately committed or
induced by prosecutors be made automatic grounds for reversal. I
agree for procedural justice reasons, but I doubt the ability (and
desire) of most appellate courts to distinguish deliberate errors
from inadvertent ones.159
Overall, I think the great expansion of the harmless error doc-

trine over the past three decades'" illustrates the influence of
simple economic intuitions on judicial analysis. Surely the expansion owes much to the sense that reversals when errors are
harmless are "all costs and no benefits," even if this is not so. My
claim is not that the economic costs should be ignored in consider-

ing how harmless error should be treated; they are properly
regarded as important. Rather, it is that the economic costs-in
money and the time required for retrials that will not change verdicts-are so salient for judges that they are easily overweighted
relative to the benefits of reversing despite likely harmlessness.'16
Even if the deterrent value of reversing for harmless errors would
make reversals economically cheaper in the long run, the prospect

156

157

Id.

Doctrinal

reversal rather than dismissed as harmless.

158 In Posner's scheme one might want to balance the cost of deliberate error against
convictions of actually guilty people that would not have occurred but for the evidentiary
error. See Posner, supra note 6, at 1519. One should also consider the empirical costs
of overdeterrence.

159 Also, difficult questions arise. Is it deliberate error when a prosecutor offers
inadmissible hearsay knowing that if the defendant chooses to waive the hearsay
objection the evidence may fairly be considered by the jury? Does it become deliberate
error if the defendant does object and the prosecutor argues in favor of admissibility
or stands passively by while the judge mistakenly overrules the objection?

160 See Charles S. Chapel, The Irony of Harmless Error, 51 Okla. L. Rev. 501, 503
n.15 (1998) (listing the Supreme Court cases in which the harmless error doctrine has
been extended).

161 The costs of retrials may also induce courts to hold that errors are harmless when
they may not have been.
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of immediately saving time and money by avoiding retrials is likely
to dominate judicial thinking.'62
2. Federal Rule 403: Relevance and Prejudice
Posner next turns his attention to Federal Rule 403, the rule which
tells judges to weigh the probative value of evidence against the

likelihood that it will prejudice or confuse the jury or require more
time than it is worth. He sees Federal Rule 403 as central to the
economic analysis of evidence law, because it mandates a costbenefit analysis in deciding whether to admit evidence, and he
analogizes it to the well-known Hand formula which reduces negli-

gence to a cost-benefit test.163 Federal Rule 403 operates in a common
sense fashion, however, and since many of the costs it recognizes
are not distinctively economic ones, unlike the Hand formula with
respect to tort law, it does not signify an inherent economic logic
underlying the law of evidence. Indeed, the requirement that probative value be "substantially outweighed" by associated costs indicates
that the drafters were not thinking in purely cost-benefit, much less
economic, terms.
Federal Rule 403's "substantially outweighs" language may have
been intended to serve the function Posner suggests, namely preventing judges from displacing juries as factfinders by making
admissibility decisions based on whom the judge thinks should

win," but I doubt it. The Federal Rules do not seem to have be
designed to control biased judges.'65 Rather, I think Federal Rule
403 is tilted toward admissibility because the Federal Rules contain
a general commitment, found in Federal Rule 402, to admit all

162 A liberal harmless error doctrine has an important practical benefit that makes
me think better of it than my textual discussion might suggest. It allows judges to
affirm the verdicts of the obviously guilty without distorting legal doctrine. Without a
liberal harmless error rule, some appellate courts would be tempted to interpret their
laws so as to uphold trial court convictions in order to keep heinous criminals in jail.
Hence, bad faith applications of the harmless error doctrine may contribute more to
the integrity of the legal system than good faith application of the rule.
163Posner, supra note 6, at 1522-23.
164 Id. at 1523.

165 Consider, for example, the wide discretion Federal Rule 611 gives judges to control
the examination of witnesses or the discretion judges have to find preliminary questions
of fact. Indeed, draft versions of the Federal Rules would have made admitting hearsay
a matter of judicial discretion.
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relevant evidence unless there is a good reason to exclude it. The

drafters thought that the mere likelihood that prejudice, waste of
time, or the like outweighed probative value was not sufficient to
justify excluding relevant evidence. I expect they wanted to avoid
not just the biased exclusion of evidence that concerns Posner, but
its mistaken unbiased exclusion. Moreover, determining whether
probative value is outweighed by other considerations can be difficult. For a jury that is in equipoise, even slightly probative evidence
can tip the balance, and the court cannot be sure what the jurors
think of cases before their verdicts. Excluding probative evidence
that would tip the balance will lead to injustice, whereas admitting
it will lead to the proper result, even if the jury is far more influenced by the evidence than a rational jury should be.
Also, the drafters may have realized what the Supreme Court
recently recognized, namely, that the apparently objective test of
relevance in Federal Rule 401 is incomplete. This at least is the les-

son I draw from Old Chief v. United States,76 where the Court
recognizes what I call narrative relevance: Namely, that evidence

may be admissible simply because it fills out the contours of a
party's story.167 This concept recognizes the likely validity of the
"story model" of jury information processing'68 and its implication,
namely that even apart from cognitive biases, the rational actor of
economic analysis does not adequately model juror decisionmaking.'69
Hence, had Federal Rule 403 been constructed so that in an ideal
world it would give a rational actor's decisions the highest possible
payoff over the long run,'70 it would probably not be the best

166 519 U.S. 172 (1997).
167 See Lempert et al., supra note 54, at 251-54.

168See W. Lance Bennett & Martha S. Feldman, Reconstructing Reality in the
Courtroom: Justice and Judgment in American Culture (1981); Nancy Pennington &
Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story Model, 13
Cardozo L. Rev. 519 (1991).
169Jason Schklar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juror Reactions to DNA Evidence:
Errors and Expectancies, 23 Law and Hum. Behav. 159 (1999); David Schum & Anne
W. Martin, Formal and Empirical Research on Cascaded Inference in Jurisprudence,
17 Law & Soc'y Rev. 105 (1982).
170 A scheme that excludes evidence whenever probative value is less than the costs
mentioned in Federal Rule 403 will not necessarily lead to more accurate decisions,
even if the judge is always accurate in striking the balance and jurors respond to both
the probative and prejudicial aspects of evidence. Although a piece of evidence might
be considerably more prejudicial than probative, if its probative value tips the scales,
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scheme to maximize payoffs from imperfec
sionmaking. A rule that admits some eviden
to a coherent narrative, that allows considerable redundancy, and
that fits familiar and easy to apply competing causal schemas is
likely to yield better outcomes than a rule based strictly on rational
actor assumptions. Federal Rule 403 wisely assumes that neither
judges nor jurors are fully rational decisionmakers, and it opts for
decisions in which errors admitting useless or even harmful information are more likely than errors excluding helpful information.171
Federal Rule 403's logic is thus contrary to Posner's intuition. It
is one of common sense consideration of costs and benefits, with a
strong tilt toward admission when costs and benefits are only
somewhat unbalanced. It does not embrace the logic of either economics or rational actor models.'72

Posner also seems to think that trial judges are too lax in invoking Federal Rule 403's permission to exclude evidence that wastes
time, for he suggests that trials might be considerably shorter than
they now are. Again, I think the economic perspective misleads,
because it does not consider all the values a trial serves, especially
legitimacy.173 Research suggests that when people are being judged,
legitimacy is greatly enhanced if they feel they have been allowed

excluding it will lead to a mistaken verdict if other evidence sufficient to tip the scales
is not available. One could, of course, tautologically argue that this could never happen
because if the evidence was essential its probative value would always exceed the
prejudice it brings. But judges pass on evidence as a case unfolds, when it is not clear
how close a case will ultimately be.
171 Lempert et al., supra note 54, at 226, 233-34.
172 logic of Federal Rule 401, which provides that "'[r]elevant evidence' means
evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be

without the evidence," does imply a rational actor model. Fed. R. Evid. 401; see

Lempert, supra note 43 (arguing that Bayesian likelihood ratios provide an adequate
model of Federal Rule 401). It is probably for this reason that, although the rule is
fundamental, it has never fully guided admissibility decisions. See Old Chief, 519 U.S.
at 178-79; Lempert et al., supra note 54, at 220-26.
173 Let me make clear that I am not saying legitimacy could not be a value taken into
account in an economic analysis of optimum trial length. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra
note 36. But I am making the conceptual claim that legitimacy is not inherently
economic in nature and the empirical claim that, consistent with writing on the
economics of evidence law by Posner and others, it is not a value that the economic
perspective brings to mind and is one that is not often (if ever) included in formal

economic models of trial processes.
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to tell their full stories.174 A trial that aspires to legitimacy in the
eyes of the parties may have to allow victims, defendants, their
spokespersons (that is, lawyers), and even witnesses to talk past the
point where what they say has diminishing evidentiary returns. The
same result may be demanded by the public's desire to know the
full story of what happened.175
3. Character Evidence: Federal Rules 404, 413-15, 609

Posner makes a number of intriguing points in his treatment of
character evidence. He offers as a justification for Federal Rule
404, the propensity rule,'76 the argument that the weak probative

force of propensity character evidence is counterbalanced by the
likelihood that recidivists will be punished more harshly than first
time offenders and so have a greater incentive to refrain from
crime.'77 He also provides an intriguing justification for Federal
Rules 413-15, which allow character evidence to show propensity
in the case of certain sex crimes. Posner thinks these exceptions to
Federal Rule 404(b) are justified, because the impulses that lead to
most sex crimes are not widely shared, and those who commit such
crimes have few substitute ways of gratification. Other crimes, like
theft, for example, are motivated by widely shared desires, which

174 See Casper, supra note 35, at 168-72; Lind & Tyler, supra note 35, at 66; John
Thibaut & Laurens Walker, Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis 94-95
(1975).

175 Posner also seems to think that shortening trials to what is logically relevant to
prove a case will reduce the cognitive overload on jurors. The question of what
constitutes cognitive overload is an empirical one. Evidence that seems logically
unnecessary to prove a case may not cause overload and may have substantial
cognitive benefits. Sheer redundancy is valuable because a point that has escaped a
juror the first time it is made may be caught on the second or third go round. Also,
evidence with no logical bearing on a point may fill in a gap in a story and so facilitate
comprehension of a party's position. Finally, a jury decision can be a hard one
because people read evidence differently and disagree about its impact. What is
overkill for most jurors may be dispositive for some. Hence, some kinds of
redundancy and overkill make a jury's decisionmaking task easier, as would some

evidence we keep from juries. Anecdotally, I have heard jurors express great relief
when, after they have convicted a person, they hear that he has a substantial record of
past crimes. Along with the relief goes the sense that their deliberations would have
been far less agonizing had they only known.
176 The rule excludes evidence of prior crimes when offered to show a propensity to
commit a charged crime.
177 Posner, supra note 6, at 1525.
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can be satisfied in a number of different legal ways.'78 Finally, Posner argues that Federal Rule 609, which allows impeachment by
prior felonies, is misguided because recidivists and first offenders
have similar incentives to lie so long as they are facing similar
punishment."79
These are interesting ideas, even if they are not all new. The argument regarding Federal Rules 413-15, which reflects an economist's
concern with the substitutability of goods, is a nice example of how
one discipline's thought patterns can yield new and potentially
valid insights for another field.
Yet as justifications for or reasons to change existing rules, none
of Posner's arguments takes us far beyond where we are now. This
is mainly because we do not know whether Posner's claims are empirically valid. Habitual criminals and first time offenders may not
have similar incentives to lie, even when they are accused of crimes
with similar penalties, because they may differently fear the penalties they face or differently assess the likelihood that they will go
free without lying. We also know little about the degree to which
past criminal convictions predict future crime or how the threat of
enhanced penalties for recidivist crime or the effects of past encounters with the criminal justice system reduce (or possibly
enhance) propensities toward crime.
Even Posner's reasonable suppositions about the relative
strength of the impulses that motivate sex criminals and thieves
and the likely substitutability of legitimate versus illegal means of
satisfying them require empirical verification. The strength of motives (at least as evidenced by recidivism) among sex criminals

seems to vary widely.'80 Moreover, at some level the motive of sexual gratification is widely shared and, in the case of some sex
crimes, may have easily available legal outlets. For example, the
inebriated date rapist who interprets a "no" as a "yes" may have a
normal sex drive and no special difficulty in finding women who
consent. As for theft and other non-sex crimes, Jack Katz has suggested that many crimes have peculiar and powerful seductions for

178 Id.

179 Id. at 1527.

180 Marnie E. Rice & Grant T. Harris, Cross-Validation and Extension of the
Violence Risk Appraisal Guide for Child Molesters and Rapists, 21 Law & Hum.
Behav. 231, 239 (1997).
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those who engage in them, regardless of the material objectives at
which they aim.t8t So the difference between the crimes that fall
under Federal Rule 404's ban on propensity evidence and the
crimes excepted from the ban by Federal Rules 413-15 may not be
as stark as Posner supposes.
Moreover, even if past sex crimes are more probative of enduring criminal propensities than other crimes, we are not much closer
to knowing whether the exceptional treatment of the Federal Rule
413-15 crimes is warranted, given the values that must be balanced.
Evidence of past sex crimes may be considerably more prejudicial
than evidence of most other crimes, and juries may be more prone
to overestimate the probative value of prior sex crimes than of
crimes that do not seem to be the product of a depraved character.
The relative probative value of different kinds of crimes does not
alone make the case for an exception to Federal Rule 404(b); one
must also consider costs, although a non-economist should not
have to remind an economist of this.
Posner's analysis of Federal Rules 404, 413-15, and 609 could also
be strengthened by greater attention to institutional, as opposed to
individual, variables. The plea bargaining process, which in some
jurisdictions disposes of ninety percent or more of the criminal
docket, seems likely to disproportionately yield up two kinds of
past offenders for trial: innocent defendants and guilty defendants
who have little to lose by going to trial because they cannot win

substantial concessions by bargaining.182 The chance that innocent
past offenders will face trials is likely to be compounded by police
and prosecutorial practices. Police often begin an investigation
with attention to "usual suspects" and seek to build cases against
them. Prosecutors assessing the strength of cases and deciding
whether to drop charges will consider the use they can make of a

defendant's past convictions if a case goes to trial. These proclivities, which can entangle the innocent in prosecutions, are likely to
be greatest when a defendant's past crimes are highly prejudicial or

181 Jack Katz, Seductions of Crime: Moral and Sensual Attractions in Doing Evil
(1988).

182 More precisely, it is likely to leave a disproportionate number of offenders who
confront weak cases against them. Like Posner elsewhere in his paper, I assume that
an important reason why the case against a defendant seems weak is that the
defendant is in fact innocent.

2001] Common Sense on Stilts 1683

are thought to be highly predictive of futu
and prosecutors share Posner's intuition abo
tween character and sex crimes, then a past conviction for a sex
crime could be less predictive of guilt among cases tried for sex
crimes than convictions for crimes like theft are of tried theft cases,
even if sex criminals are more likely to recidivate than thieves.
Again, abstract analysis resolves nothing. Empirical data are
needed.

Or empirical evidence may be irrelevant. One may reasonably
argue that treating offenders who have paid their debts to society
as if they have started fresh is an important value that should shape
trials, even at the cost of excluding probative evidence. The eco-

nomic perspective does not recognize such values if it is rooted
only in the presumed importance of accurate verdicts to deterrence, as it is in Posner's version of the model. Hence, if evidence
law is evaluated only by its tendencies to serve economic values,
debate about the desirability of different evidentiary rules would
be impoverished.

Posner further argues that if prior crimes evidence were freely
admissible, and jurors were highly prone to convict habitual of-

fenders regardless of guilt, then the deterrence of habitual
offenders would be undermined.'83 This builds nicely on his earlier

argument about the importance of accurate verdicts to deterrence,"8 but as I note earlier, there are substantial weaknesses in
the argument. Although if the deterrence argument applies to any-

one, it should apply to habitual offenders, marginal effects are
likely to be tiny.'85 Prosecutors should not intentionally seek to
convict innocent defendants, and even habitual criminals will not
usually be convicted without substantial other evidence of their
criminal behavior. For the same reason, although I do not quarrel
with the economic logic that suggests that given limited prosecuto183 Posner, supra note 6, at 1526.

18 Id. at 1483-84.

185 Since habitual offenders have a greater chance than most people of being convicted

of something they did not do and have already shown a willingness to engage in
crime, the argument that they will commit crimes because they feel they will be
punished for crimes even if they do not commit them appears to fit their situation
better than that of people who have never done anything criminal. But even among

habitual offenders, false convictions are likely to be unusual, and one habitual

offender may know of few, if any, instances where this has actually happened.
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rial resources, prosecutorial attention to first time offenders will
diminish as the expected payoff from prosecuting habitual offenders
increases,186 I would expect the real world effects of any such tendency
to be de minimus and of little policy importance. The more general
point is that Posner seldom pays attention to the likely magnitude
of the effects his economic analysis predicts. Hence, even if his assumptions are reasonable and the effects he predicts occur, absent
empirical investigation, we seldom have reason to believe that the
effects will be sufficiently large to justify the policies he espouses.
Despite my quarrels with his argument, I think Posner's discussion of character evidence is more successful than most other
portions of his article. He presents new arguments that deserve to
be considered in the character evidence debate, and he reinforces
existing arguments from what, in some instances, is a novel perspective. Although I believe his assumptions about how economic
incentives play themselves out are far too weakly grounded to justify drawing practical normative implications from his analysis, it is
also true that so little is known empirically about the implications
of evidence rules for behavior that all of us, including lawmakers,
base much of what we prescribe on poorly grounded assumptions.
Hence, one cannot reject Posner's work simply because he makes
assumptions, but at the same time, one must reflect on the plausibility of his assumptions and the values and behavior they ignore.
4. Hearsay: Federal Rule 803

The hearsay rule, which is at the heart of many evidence courses,
is barely discussed by Posner. He suggests that it is probably not
needed given Federal Rule 403 and the fact that ordinary people are

used to evaluating hearsay.187 Posner does, however, see an economic justification for the hearsay rule. He believes it serves to
terminate the search for evidence before the additional benefits of
searching exceed incremental costs, with exceptions existing for

186Posner, supra note 6, at 1526.

187 The argument is a familiar one. See, e.g., Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the
Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1357,
1372 (1985); Michael L. Seigel, Rationalizing Hearsay: A Proposal for a Best Evidence
Hearsay Rule, 72 B.U. L. Rev. 893, 911 (1992). For empirical support for this position, see
Peter Miene et al., Juror Decision Making and the Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence,
76 Minn. L. Rev. 683 (1992).
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situations where this is not likely to ha
with Posner for not wanting to get too deeply entwined in the hearsay thicket, but it is disappointing that he did not try to penetrate it
further, particularly as his efforts to bypass it are not entirely convincing.
I would be quite surprised if the hearsay rule served to terminate
evidentiary searches at the point of diminishing returns. Most of
the costs of such searches occur before trial. Before trial, there is
considerable incentive to uncover relevant hearsay whether or not
it will be admissible because, as the discovery rules recognize, inadmissible hearsay may point to admissible evidence. Moreover,
there are so many ways that statements may be used for nonhearsay purposes or may be fit into an exception that a lawyer
would be foolish not to search for hearsay evidence. If it were relevant, there is quite likely to be some way to get it admitted.
As for the presentation of evidence, which in Posner's model is
part of the tribunal's search process, Posner's intuition seems right,
at least in theory. Federal Rule 403 does everything one could ask
of the hearsay rule. Indeed, in theory it does a better job, for the
ideal, all-knowing judge would always correctly balance the probative value of hearsay against the costs of confusion, waste of time,
and prejudice that the presentation of hearsay would entail.189 It is
true that a blanket rule necessarily errs in a number of cases, but
by the same token, no one has yet found the ideal judge.
Although Posner slights the hearsay rule, there is much that an
economic analysis of the rule could address. Arguably, the entire
rule is justifiable on economic grounds. Given that we want to keep
unreliable evidence from the jury, it may be cheaper financially,
cognitively, and in terms of cost effectiveness to do so by a rule
that is admittedly both over- and underinclusive than to do so by

the decisions of a less than ideal judge. With such a rule, the parties
may do considerable self-policing-so many issues that would be
brought to the judge in the absence of a rule would never arise.

18Posner, supra note 6, at 1530.
189The text here, like Posner's argument, simplifies a bit. A judge applying Federal
Rule 403 would not always exclude hearsay worth less than the time it takes to present
it. This is because Federal Rule 403's "substantially outweigh" language mandates what
in the ideal world, would be a less than optimal tradeoff. See supra text accompanyin
notes 164-171.
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The bright-line character of the hearsay rule (at least as compared
to Federal Rule 403) might make decisions easier, both at trial and
on appeal. With a clear rule, parties can more efficiently plan their
cases, because they are less likely to be surprised by what evidence
is admissible. Judicial biases will have less effect on admissibility
decisions, and, in order to reverse a trial judge, appellate courts
will have to point to a rule violation rather than simply disagree
with the trial judge's exercise of discretion.
Moreover, some specific exceptions seem in large measure to be
justified on economic grounds. Federal Rule 803(6) pertaining to
business records and Federal Rule 803(8) dealing with official records are, for example, justified not just because the evidence they
admit is likely to be reliable, but because of the particularly high
costs of bringing those who prepare business and official records to

court. The same could be said of rules regarding learned treatises, 1'
ancient documents,191 prior convictions," and, indeed, most of the
Federal Rule 803 provisions from 803(9) on. Using the broader economic perspective Posner champions, which sees verdict accuracy
as maximizing efficiency through deterrence, a further economic
basis can be found for all hearsay exceptions, since all are aimed at
drawing a line between evidence that aids and evidence that hinders accurate decisionmaking.
Of course, against these economic virtues, one would have to
balance costs. One major cost, as any law student could testify to, is
the cost of learning the rule and its exceptions, not to mention the

additional money paid for texts that, to judge by my own,193 are
about twenty percent longer than they would be without the rule.
There are also the efficiency costs to admitting unreliable and excluding reliable hearsay, as well as the costs of having to secure live
witnesses to matters that could be proven just as convincingly and
far more cheaply by hearsay. No doubt the reader can add to this
list.
I can, however, treat my own economic justifications for the
hearsay rule as critically as I have treated many of Posner's ideas.
Some of my arguments, such as the economic justification for Federal
190 Fed. R. Evid. 803(18).
"I Fed. R. Evid. 803(16).
192 Fed. R. Evid. 803(22).
193 See Lempert et al., supra note 54.
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Rule 806, are already part of the common sense of the profession.
Other assumptions I have made, although not unreasonable, may
be wrong. Given the tendency of appellate judges to defer to trial
judges' discretion, making the admission of hearsay a matter of discretion under Federal Rule 403 as opposed to a matter of rule
might diminish rather than increase appellate reversals for hearsay
reasons. Normatively, my economic analysis, like so many of Posner's, provides almost no guidance. We do not know empirically
how much valid evidence the hearsay rule keeps out or how much
misleading evidence it admits, nor do we know what judges would
do if admitting hearsay were always a matter of discretion. Also,
the analysis ignores changes in behavior that the demise of the
hearsay rule might stimulate, as well as how the balance of advantage at trial might change depending on a party's ability to create or

gather hearsay."94 Finally, the analysis ignores important noneconomic
values that motivate the hearsay rule (and its close relative, the
Confrontation Clause). Even when courtroom testimony is not constitutionally required, the virtues of in-court testimony that Justice
Antonin Scalia so eloquently described in his opinion in Coy v.
Iowa195 still exist. These advantages are lost when hearsay is admitted.
My ability to identify as many shortcomings in my own economic
analysis of the hearsay rule as I have in most of Posner's evidence
rule analyses tells me that, if the goal is to say something useful
about evidence law that goes beyond common sense, the difficulty
lies not in Posner but in his project. The hearsay rule is not different from other rules I have discussed. Economics does not
obviously provide information, methods, or theory likely to enhance our understanding of the rule or to increase our ability to
improve it. The common sense injunction I followed, to examine
the hearsay rule in light of its costs and benefits, does not require
economics as its herald. Although economics might contribute to
understanding or reforming the hearsay rule if we had considerably

194 For a discussion of these matters see id. at 702-07.

195 487 U.S. 1012, 1018 (1988). Justice Scalia notes: "The phrase still persists, 'Look
me in the eye and say that.' Given these human feelings of what is necessary for
fairness, the right of confrontation 'contributes to the establishment of a system of
criminal justice in which the perception as well as the reality of fairness prevails."' Id.

at 1018-19 (citations omitted).
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more empirical information than we now have about trial processes
and the implication of the rule for judge, jury and litigant behavior,
at the moment we lack adequate information about these matters
and seem a long way from acquiring it. So with hearsay, as with
other evidence rules, I do not see economics as offering important,
novel contributions.
5. Marital Privilege

Posner's discussion of privileges has some of the same weaknesses
as my discussion of hearsay: untested if not unrealistic assumptions;
a failure to acknowledge important noneconomic values; and an
analysis that, in the absence of reliable empirical information, becomes indeterminate as more factors are considered. Posner sees
the marital privilege as designed to protect statements to spouses
for fear of weakening marriages by making spouses distrustful of
each other; although he has doubts about the validity of this ra-

tionale, he offers no other."9 Posner can be excused for giving only
this reason; it is the establishment line.'97 But as I have suggested
elsewhere,198 and as others before me have recognized,19 there are
good non-utilitarian reasons for respecting intimate relationships
and for not wanting to force one spouse to be the instrument of the
other's downfall. As Professor James Gardner put it, "something in
the spirit is shocked and hurt at the betrayal of former confidences,
at the revelation of the secrets of the bed-chamber, and perhaps at

the vindictiveness of alienated ex-spouses."2" Moreover, putting

aside these arguments, which McCormick denigrates as "interests
of delicacy,"201 we might want a society in which the police know they
cannot get evidence by coercing a presumably innocent spouse to
cooperate in punishing a perhaps guilty loved one.202

196Posner, supra note 6, at 1531.

197 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980); Jeremy Bentham, A Treatise
on Judicial Evidence 238 (London, J.W. Paget 1825); 8 Wigmore, supra note 8, ? 2332.

I" Richard 0. Lempert, A Right to Every Woman's Evidence, 66 Iowa L. Rev. 725

(1981).

199 James A. Gardner, A Re-evaluation of the Attorney-Client Privilege (pts. 1 & 2),
8 Vill. L. Rev. 279,447 (1963).
200 Id. at 489.

201 McCormick on Evidence ? 90, at 180 (1st ed. 1954).
202 This was what happened in the two cases in which the Supreme Court faced the
issue of whether the witness spouse or defendant spouse had the power to invoke
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Posner also speculates about the detrimental effects of the privilege, especially in lowering the cost of crime for married people
and so encouraging people to commit crimes. Since a criminal life
is destabilizing, he suggests the privilege might actually have the
perverse effect of harming marriages. I would love to see even anecdotal evidence about marriages that broke up because a spouse
committed a crime that he would not have committed but for the
privilege.203 Posner suggests, however, that the privilege might not
cost the state much evidence, because if its abolition were widely
known, spouses would be less likely to make damaging admissions

to each other.21 Still, Posner suggests, the benefits from discouraging crime are not wholly negligible. However, if we push the
economic analysis further, it appears that the privilege might forestall crime. Regardless of the privilege, a substantial number of
marriages today break up with some bitterness. The privilege for
confidential marital communications only protects a criminal from
an ex-spouse's (or spouse's) testimony in court. It does not stop her
from going to the police, informing them of her husband's crimes,
and giving them solid leads that will result in his conviction. If abolishing the privilege leads to less communication by spouses about
their criminal activities, angry spouses or ex-spouses would have
less to disclose about their mates. Hence, abolishing the privilege
might lead to more rather than less unpunished crime and lessened
(and waive) the adverse testimony variant of the marital privilege. This version of the
privilege provides, with some exceptions, that one spouse cannot be required to
testify against the other in a criminal case. In Hawkins v. United States, where the
Court maintained the traditional rule vesting the privilege in the defendant spouse,
the defendant's wife had been detained as a material witness and told that she would
be freed if she agreed to testify against her husband. Hawkins v. United States, 358
U.S. 74, 82-83 (1958) (Stewart, J., concurring). In Trammel v. United States, where the
Court decided the witness spouse should be the holder of the privilege, the government
promised the defendant's wife, who was apparently not innocent, lenient treatment
for her alleged part in the crime if she agreed to testify against her husband. Trammel,
445 U.S. at 42-43.

203 Posner never distinguishes between the adverse testimony privilege and the privilege

for confidential marital communications. He seems here to be talking about the adverse
testimony privilege for he says that the privilege might induce some people to marry
who would not otherwise do so, and the adverse testimony privilege is more likely to
have this effect; but he also says a stronger argument could be made for the privilege
if it were limited to civil cases, and the adverse testimony privilege usually does not
apply in civil cases.

204 Posner, supra note 6, at 1531. Here Posner is clearly thinking of the privilege for
confidential marital communications.
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deterrence. Of course, if criminals were aware the privilege did not
prevent spouses from talking outside of court, they might react by
not disclosing their crimes to their spouses.
But there is no sense in continuing along this chain of reasoning,
even if it is fun to spin out possibilities. We simply do not know
what the implications of the privilege are for capturing criminals or
whether the marital privileges matter sufficiently to make a difference in crime or its deterrence. Without empirical information, the
economic approach is again indeterminate in its implications for
the rules of evidence, even when only values recognized by economics are considered. Add to the indeterminacy of the economic
analysis the important implications of noneconomic values, and a
strong case can be made on Federal Rule 403 grounds (waste of
time, more prejudicial than probative) for excluding economic analyses altogether from discussions of the spousal privilege. [?] But this
will not help. Instrumental analyses resting on ungrounded empirical assumptions are common in discussions of privileges, and they
influence courts and legislatures alike. Economists might as well
join in the fray.
6. Attorney-Client Privilege
Posner next briefly explores the attorney-client privilege. The
logic of his analysis leads him to conclude that abolishing the attorney-client privilege would make people wary of confiding in lawyers,
unless they knew what admissions would be damaging, which would
in turn give people an incentive to learn more law, so "[a]brogating

the privilege might thus increase enrollment at law schools!"205 The
first part of this chain of reasoning is entirely orthodox, but the notion that abolishing the privilege might increase law school
enrollments is an original contribution of the economic perspective.
Again, however, there is an exclamation mark; I assume Posner is
joking, and I did smile. But the fact that, absent empirical evidence,
there is no obvious stopping point in the chain of economic reasoning

until this absurd conclusion suggests the limitations of economic
analysis rather than its utility. Aside from this point, Posner's observations about the attorney-client privilege and what it implies
for evidence gathering are reasonable but completely familiar.
205 Id. at 1532.
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7. The Mapp Rule

Posner makes an interesting point in discussing the Mapp2'
exclusionary rule. If effective sanctions were substituted for the

exclusionary rule, he tells us, there would be no evidentiary gains,
because the sanctions would presumably deter the very searches
that now yield suppressed evidence.207 For this reason, he suggests
that a search be deemed illegal only if the evidentiary benefits do
not at least equal the cost to the victim or that illegal searches be
sanctioned only by suits for damages. The first suggestion is no so-

lution at all. It is hard enough to place a value on removing one
drug dealer from the streets along with a pound of cocaine, and it is
yet more difficult to place a value on twenty years behind bars, except by arbitrary assumptions, which in practice would surely come
to favor the state. More importantly, unlike the exclusionary rule,
which, if it had its intended effect, would eliminate most searches

without probable cause because little would be gained from them,'

Posner's suggestion does not help those whom society is most interested in protecting: people who are stopped without probable
cause and suffer the indignities of a search, although they have
nothing illegal on them. Posner's second solution could protect innocent victims only if the costs of suing were less than expected
damage awards. I do not think this is likely. A better tactic might
be for police to give everyone searched a ticket redeemable for,
say, five dollars, regardless of whether contraband was found. If
the police complied (a big if), police commanders would know
which officers had the worst cost to evidence ratio, and they might
establish reasonable search norms and work to control the overzealous.Y

206Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
207 Posner, supra note 6, at 1533.

208 I use the words "most" and "little" because the police might value harassing people
or removing guns or contraband from the streets.

209 If one wanted to increase deterrence, the money for search tickets would com
from a bonus fund the police would receive each year. To be sure there was no
overdeterrence, the fund could be replenished for each hit. Of course then one migh

have to have stiff penalties for planting evidence in order to reduce the temptation to
do this. Again, in the absence of empirical evidence, the economic perspective provide

ideas but no guidance.
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8. The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
Posner devotes the most space in his consideration of privileges
to the privilege against self-incrimination. As many others have, he
questions its value. Although he acknowledges the danger of torture
by the police if the provision did not exist, he feels that problem
can be dealt with by outlawing torture and other high pressure forms
of police questioning. To think that, absent the Fifth Amendment,
a law would be enough to moderate police tactics is optimistic
given the psychologically coercive tactics that are sometimes used
today despite the protection of Miranda210 and the Fifth Amend21
ment. 1 Posner also suggests that if people were deciding whether
to have a Fifth Amendment from behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance, most people would not want it since they would not expect
to be criminals. I wonder. Even those who would not expect the
absence of the privilege to hurt them might not want to live in a society where some people were hurt (for example, tortured or
otherwise coerced to confess) because the privilege did not exist.
Moreover, the privilege protects innocent people as well as criminals, so the fact that people do not expect to be criminals does not
mean they would not want the privilege.
Posner acknowledges that if innocent people benefit from the Fifth
Amendment, the economic case for its abolition is problematic and
depends on empirical evidence. Perhaps if police interrogators put
no pressure to speak on those they arrest, but simply did not give
Miranda warnings, the innocent would lose nothing from the privilege's abrogation. This will not happen. Even with the protection
of the privilege and the prophylactic rules that surround it, suspects
who confess often do so because of the psychological pressure the
police place on them,212 and mistaken verdicts can result.213

210 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
211 See Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational
Choice and Irrational Action, 74 Denv. U. L. Rev. 979 (1997).
212 Id. at 1031-32.

213 Jim Dwyer et al., Actual Innocence: Five Days to Execution and Other

Dispatches from the Wrongly Convicted 78 (2000). In Japan, which does not have a
Fifth Amendment, two cases in which accused criminals were mistakenly convicted of
murder and sentenced to death were a major impetus for considering whether to
institute jury trials. In each case, the state's evidence consisted largely of a confession.
As I write, the Commonwealth of Virginia just freed a man from death row when his
innocence was shown by DNA evidence. His conviction was based on a confession.
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Posner also argues for allowing guilt to be inferred from a defendant's refusal to take the stand.214 He is clear about his reasons.
He says he is hard pressed to think of a credible explanation for
why an innocent person might fear the consequences of testifying,
and he thinks that the danger of an innocent person making admissions that would lead the jury to think him guilty may be theoretical
rather than real.215 If he is right, his recommendations make sense to
me. But Posner is forgetting his own analysis of Federal Rule 609's
provision for impeachment by prior convictions, which is one reason an innocent person might not want to testify. The prospect of
facing impeachment by evidence about one's prior bad acts or by
testimony that one has a bad character for truth and veracity is another. Also, the literature on eyewitness testimony indicates that
juries use witness confidence as a cue to accuracy, even though confidence seems to reflect aspects of personality that have little if any
relationship to whether testimony is correct.216 An innocent defendant who would be a nervous witness might rightfully fear he
would be hurt rather than helped by taking the stand, especially if
the jury were to contrast his demeanor with that of a confident police officer, eyewitness, or expert witnesses testifying for the state.
Finally, the state invariably has good faith reasons for arresting and
prosecuting defendants. An innocent defendant might hurt his case
by confirming portions of the state's case; for example, that he
owns a gun of the same caliber as the one used in a killing. In short,
there are many reasons to doubt Posner's suggestion that the innocent
will always waive the Fifth Amendment to signal their innocence.
Allowing an accused's silence to be held against him will, for some
innocent people, increase the chance of a wrongful conviction, either because the inference hurts them or because the inference
persuades them to testify, which opens the door to prejudicial im-

Francis X. Clines, Furor Anew with Release of Man Who Was Innocent, N.Y. Times,

Feb. 11, 2001, at L23.

214 Posner, supra note 6, at 1534-35.

215 Id. at 1535.

216 See Steven Penrod & Brian Cutler, Witness Confidence and Witness Accuracy:
Assessing Their Forensic Relation, 1 Psychol., Pub. Pol'y & L. 817, 825 (1995); Gary
L. Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, "Good, You Identified the Suspect": Feedback to
Eyewitnesses Distorts Their Reports of the Witnessing Experience, 83 J. Applied

Psychol. 360, 361 (1998).
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peachment or other kinds of harm.217 Of course there would be
benefits to putting a price on claiming the Fifth Amendmentpresumably more guilty people would be convicted. Theory, how-

ever, says nothing about what the tradeoff will be. Wise policy
requires empirical evidence that we do not have and have little
prospect of acquiring. But even reliable empirical evidence supporting Posner's position would not necessarily end discussion, for
it is not unreasonable to value the privilege for what it says about

human dignity, even if its abrogation would diminish mistaken acquittals without increasing wrongful convictions.
9. Expert Evidence
Posner devotes more space to expert witnesses than he does to

any other topic in his third section, perhaps because experts pose
particularly vexing problems for the law. Much of Posner's discussion and many of his recommendations for reform do not draw
especially on economics, and where they do, the implications of
economic reasoning are usually indeterminate, resolvable, in principle, only by empirical investigation and, realistically, probably
not resolvable at all.218
In discussing experts, Posner makes a number of implicit assumptions about experts and trials that are perhaps (and in some
cases certainly) not true as a general matter. For example, he argues that experts can be made to hold themselves to high standards

217 This may, of course, happen today, for the jurors can make adverse inferences
even if they are told not to treat an accused's failure to testify as evidence of guilt.
Posner makes the interesting, and I think correct, suggestion that if jurors are to take
seriously the admonition that they are not to infer guilt from the fact that the accused
has not testified, it will help if they are given a credible reason why an innocent

accused would not take the stand. However, the most likely explanation, fear of
impeachment, might do more harm than good. Although Kalven and Zeisel found
that not taking the stand was about as harmful as taking the stand and being
impeached by prior crimes, defendants who do not take the stand are sometimes
acquitted. Kalven and Zeisel, supra note 24, at 180.
218 Posner's most intriguing and original observation, and the one that most clearly
represents a law and economics perspective, is his suggestion that a social cost of
expert testimony is the deflection of academic researchers from scholarly work to
testifying. But then Posner goes on to suggest reasons why social costs may not exceed
social gains after all. He properly notes, as a gain, enhanced deterrence that may
result because expert testimony increases the likelihood of a correct verdict, but his
economic perspective again seems to give no weight to the value of just outcomes.
Posner, supra note 6, at 1540.

2001] Common Sense on Stilts 1695
by the threat of reputational sanctions. But Posner's image of an
expert seems to be the academic expert or an employee of a consulting firm testifying to an issue of science or economics. The most
commonly found experts in civil litigation are, however, physicians,
who are most often treating physicians or other clinicians.219 In
criminal cases they are usually police officers or forensic scientists
employed by the state. It is unlikely that the reputational sanctions
that Posner sees as disciplining expert testimony will have much
bite with such witnesses.220 Moreover, it is a mistake to suppose that
information about an expert's past failings as a witness will be uncovered by a later litigant or used effectively if it is. The trial judge,
who, according to Posner, might destroy the market value of an
expert through public criticism is unlikely to do so, and when he
does so he may be wrong. What is more likely is that a judge who
feels an expert's testimony deserves no credence will exclude it un-

der Daubert.221 A Daubert exclusion may itself carry a signal, but if
taken as an indicator of junk science or expert incompetence, it
carries a substantial danger of being misread.
In Daubert, for example, the experts whose testimony was later
excluded were reputable, and standing by itself, their expert testimony was, for the most part, not unsound.222 In the face of substantial
epidemiological evidence that showed no association between Bendectin and birth defects, however, it would have been unreasonable
for a jury to credit the plaintiff's evidence over the defendant's, and
a directed verdict would have been proper had the case reached
trial. It was for this reason and not because of shoddy science that
the expert testimony was excluded and summary judgment issued.
The signaling value of summary judgments or directed verdicts is

219 Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 Wis. L. Rev. 1113, 1119; Samuel R.
Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to
Settlement, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 31-32 (1996).
220 Consider Texas's so-called "Dr. Death," who regularly testified that homicide
defendants were sure to be dangerous, although the psychology profession publicly
stated that it was impossible to predict dangerousness with such confidence. See
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 896-902 (1983).
221 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The Supreme Court
case dealt with the proper interpretation of Federal Rule 702 regarding the
admissibility of expert evidence. The substantive issue at trial was whether the
popular morning sickness drug Bendectin had teratogenic effects. Id.
222 Id. at 583 & n.2; Ronald Simon, Some Answers to the Daubert Puzzle, 9 St.
John's J. Legal Comment. 37, 41 (1994).
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also weak, because expert testimony may bear on only part of a
case, meaning that a case may be lost on a directed verdict or
summary judgment although an expert's testimony is persuasive on
the point for which it is offered. Criticism by a judge or a devastating cross-examination in one case may, as Posner suggests, come
back to haunt an expert in future cases; but often it will not, because opposing parties in later cases will not have the information.
Inconsistencies in an academic expert's writing may also be overlooked. While in some high stakes cases it would be derelict not to
do a searching examination of an opposing expert's history, in
other cases different kinds of trial preparation will be wiser investments.

Posner, like many non-economist commentators,223 urges more

use of court-appointed experts.224 But like others before him, he ignores structural barriers to the use of such experts, particularly the
difficulty, noted by Professor Samuel Gross, of preparing an expert
to testify in an adversary system.225 This is not to say that innovative
uses of experts should not be pursued. For example, courtappointed statistical experts might work with the parties' experts
before trial to develop a common data file or to resolve model
specification issues.226 Or an expert might be appointed to answer
juror questions about other expert evidence without giving an
opinion on the merits.227

Posner's other cures for the problems posed by expert testimony
include (1) having professional associations maintain abstracts of
members' testimony along with criticisms by opposing counsel or
other experts and (2) requiring lawyers to disclose the names of all
experts they consult in order to discourage shopping until the rare

223 E.g., Developments in the Law-Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific
Evidence, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1481, 1589-91, 1605 (1995); Graham C. Lilly, The Decline
of the American Jury, 72 U. Colo. L. Rev. 53, 89-90 (2001); George Summerfield &
Todd Parkhurst, Procedures for Claim Construction After Markman, 20 Miss. C. L.
Rev. 107, 113 (1999).
224 Posner, supra note 6, at 1539.

225 Gross, Expert Evidence, supra note 219, at 1138-41 (explaining the difficulty of

preparing expert witnesses).

226 Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Econometrics in the Courtroom, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1048,

1095-96 (1985).

227 Richard 0. Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Let's Not Rush

Judgment, 80 Mich. L. Rev. 68, 125-26 (1981).
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expert who agrees with the lawyer's position is found. Neither of
these recommendations rests especially on economics, and each
has its difficulties.
Although I think that there is a place for peer review of expert

testimony,22 I do not think Posner's plan is workable. Abstracts of
expert testimony may fail to capture the important qualifications or
nuances of an expert's testimony, and opposing counsel or experts
may have personal as well as professional reasons to want to sully
an expert's reputation. I expect professional associations would not
want to have to resolve such disputes or to face the danger of lawsuits if they decided wrongly. Perhaps occasional article-length
synopses of, or comments on, expert testimony are a better way to
proceed.229 If all experts in a discipline had to turn in copies of their
expert testimony to their disciplinary association with a risk it
would be chosen for commentary in a discipline journal, sloppy or
dishonest expert testimony might be deterred.
Requiring parties to list all experts they consult has much to
commend it for the reason Posner gives. At the same time there
are serious potential costs. A law firm knowing that it would have
to reveal the names of all the experts it consults would want to ensure that the first expert they consulted agreed with their position.
This would lead them to seek out experts who, through their writing, past testimony, or otherwise, had signaled the positions they
were likely to take in particular kinds of cases. But people with
strong prior positions and a willingness to signal them might not be
the best experts in their fields. They would certainly not be the
most open-minded. Also, there are benefits from expert shopping.
If a party goes to the two or three best experts she can find and
none thinks she has a case, the rational response will ordinarily be
to settle the litigation rather than to continue searching in the hope
of finding an expert who is both favorable and credible. Whether
the costs of discouraging expert shopping exceed the benefits of
discouraging it, and of disclosing it when it does occur, is an em-

228A panel on Statistics and the Courts on which I served made such a
recommendation. The Evolving Role of Statistical Assessments as Evidence in the
Courts 183 (Stephen E. Fienberg ed., 1989).
229 See, e.g., Phoebe C. Ellsworth, To Tell What We Know or Wait for Godot?, 15
Law & Hum. Behav. 77 (1991); Ronald Roesch et al., Social Science and the Courts:
The Role of Amicus Curiae Briefs, 15 Law & Hum. Behav. 1 (1991).
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pirical question. Perhaps a wise compromise is to require parties to
disclose the number of experts consulted, their fields, and what
each was asked to do, while allowing them to keep secret the names
of the experts consulted and their views. Thinking about incentives

as an economist might brings me to this position, but economics is
not needed for such thinking. Evidence scholars do it all the time.
D. Posner's Conclusion

Posner ends his article by specifying seventeen points he thinks

he has established. I have already commented on many of the lessons that Posner thinks economics can teach. Here I shall only
comment on Posner's first point-his effort to summarize what
economics can offer evidence law.

Posner writes that "[t]he process by which evidence is obtained,
presented, and evaluated in a trial can be fruitfully modeled in
economic terms," and he claims that economicmc analysis
also ... provides a guide to optimal regulation of evidence"; hence,

" [it can ... be used as a criterion for evaluating the law of evidence."230 I disagree. In commenting on Posner's separate claims, I
think I have established that, at least until we have more reliable
empirical information, economic analyses of the kind Posner employs will ordinarily have little to offer evidence law. Both
positively and normatively, Posner's economics does not adequately address evidence law's problems, except perhaps in some
narrow areas or where economics tracks common sense. In the latter instance it is not needed. Consider one aspect of Posner's
conclusion: "Economic analysis of evidence reveals, among other
things, that the amount of evidence generated in an unregulated

adversary system may be more or less than the social optimum."'231
Evidence scholars are not used to thinking in terms of the social
optimum of evidence, but I dare say if they were, not one of them
would need to resort to economic analysis to know what Posner
claims his economic analysis reveals.232
230Posner, supra note 6, at 1542.
231 Id.

232 I know; I am not being fair to Posner. His point, I assume, is that in an abstractly
ideal system, the adversarial presentation of evidence is compatible with both the
over- and underproduction of evidence from the standpoint of welfare maximization.
If this is true, it has a certain abstract interest. But what actually happens in
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I began by hypothesizing that the reason few economists had
turned their attention to evidence law was because economics did
not have much to offer students of the rules of evidence. I turned
to Posner's article in the spirit of hypothesis testing. Given Posner's
prominence in championing the use of economics to understand legal rules and make normative prescriptions for law, as well as the
fact that his article is the first attempt to survey the field of evidence from the perspective of economics, it was reasonable to
expect that if any article could make the case for the value of economics in understanding evidence law, it would be this piece. My
conclusion is that the case has not been made.
Posner, in fact, foreshadows this conclusion in the modest claims
he makes for the economic analysis of evidence law at the start of
his article. First, he notes that economics does not furnish many of
the tools he will draw on in his effort to better understand evidence
law. He also draws on a psychologically-oriented empirical literature
on trials, decision theory, and ideas of statistical inference, intentionally taking an "eclectic" rather than a "narrowly economic"
approach.233 Posner is also modest in what he thinks his approach
will ultimately offer. For the most part, he says, it will serve "more
to refine and extend [rather] than to challenge the intuitions of the

legal professional."234 Even with these modest goals, I think that in
most areas Posner's article falls short. But his effort is decidedly

not an effort at "economic imperialism." Moreover, even if he
overclaims at points, Posner is usually well aware of the indeterminacy of the economic perspective given current empirical

knowledge, and he also knows that much of what he says is not
"news" in the field. Yet I, for one, hope he will stay interested in

adversarial systems is an empirical question. At the moment we do not have the

faintest empirical notion whether the average adversarial or inquisitorial system
comes closer to producing the socially optimal amount of evidence. Indeed, we do not
have the faintest empirically grounded notion of what the socially optimal amount of
evidence is, within or across cases. I suppose, if the only value that counted was
achieving a correct verdict, it would be the minimum amount of evidence needed to
reach that verdict. But, since we do not know when we start which verdict is correct,
this perspective is of no help in determining when a search should be terminated.
Similarly, I think the conclusion that the adversary system may generate more or less
evidence than the social optimum is of no help in thinking about the desirability of the
adversary system or about any problem of evidence law or policy.
233 Posner, supra note 6, at 1479.

234Id. at 1485.
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evidence law. Despite my many criticisms, I think the field can only
gain from his provocative involvement.
IV. OTHER ECONOMIC ANALYSES

Posner is not the first person to apply an economic perspective
to the analysis of evidence law, although he is the first to attempt
such an encompassing statement. One consequence of the broad
task Posner sets himself is that he seldom devotes more than a few
paragraphs to topics about which other scholars writing from an
economic perspective have written entire articles. Perhaps these articles are a better test than Posner's article of my hypothesis that

economics has little to offer evidence law beyond what common
sense tells us.
It seems fair to look at the challenge these other articles pose for
my hypothesis from a market-oriented perspective. As Posner says
at the outset of his article, and as a search done for me by the University of Michigan Law School's staff confirms,235 economic analyses
are not common in evidence scholarship, although law and economics
approaches have been common in other common law scholarship

for decades.2' This itself is a sign that economics has little to offe
evidence law. If the field of evidence could make good use of such
scholarship, if economic models provided more than a common
sense understanding of evidence rules, or if an economic logic unified evidence law, one would have expected a number of law and

economics scholars to have plowed this turf long before now.237
More importantly, when we look at the scholarship that has been
produced by people writing from a law and economics perspective,

235 I am grateful to Nancy Vettorello and those she supervises for conducting this
search. It was done in January 2001.

236 Although the evidence rules are now codified in the federal and most state
jurisdictions, much of what has been codified is similar to earlier common law
formulations. If there is an economic logic to the common law of evidence, similar to
what has been claimed for tort, contract, and property law, it should permeate
modern evidence codes as well.

237 I think this is true even if the suggestion I make about incentive effects, supra text
accompanying note 52, holds. Although I do not think most funding sources will seek
to draw the attention of economists to rules of evidence, the ability to make important

contributions to an area of law is also a substantial attraction. If there were obvious
important contributions economists could make to evidence law, I think more would
have been drawn to the field by now.
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we see few signs of influence within the field. To determine this, I
asked the University of Michigan Law Library to do an exhaustive
search for articles that examined rules of evidence from an economic perspective and then to investigate all citations to those

articles. Table One gives the results of this investigation. It lists the
article, the author(s), whether an author is listed as an evidence
teacher in the AALS Directory, the total number of articles each
piece is cited in (excluding self-citations), the number of citations
by scholars listed in the evidence law section of the most recent
AALS Directory, the yearly rate of citations overall and by evidence scholars through the year 2000, and the evidence rule or
issue that is the subject of the article.
The table may well miss some articles, but if only a few are
missed, it should not matter, for the articles found are likely to be
biased in favor of more rather than less influential pieces. A more
serious deficiency, for some purposes, is the lack of a control
group. Maybe evidence articles receive few citations no matter how
they approach their subject. If I were trying here to show that articles that take an economic approach to evidence are less influential
than articles that take another approach, this would be a serious
and hard to remedy deficiency.238 When my thesis is that articles
taking an economic approach to evidence have had little influence
on the field, however, it does not matter if other articles have had
little influence as well.

238Having gotten into the spirit of the economics perspective, I realized that the cost
of trying to develop a valid control sample was not worth the benefits. To do so one
would have to identify articles on the same topics as the economic articles I identified;
they would have to be by scholars similar in prominence to the authors of these
articles, and the works should be of similar length and published in similarly prominent
and accessible journals.
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Table One: Citations to Articles That Take an Avowedly Economic
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The Practice and Theory of Evidence Law- Thomas Gibbons No 1982

A Note.247 Allan C. Hutchinson

13919 J. Legal Stud. 359 (1990).
240 79 Cal. L. Rev. 313 (1991).
241 16 J.L. Econ. & Org. 365 (2000).
242 26 Rand J. of Econ. 203 (1995).

2431981 Sup. Ct. Rev. 309.
24465 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1998).
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Table One provides striking evidence of how little influence the
economic perspective has had on evidence law. Only two articles in
the table have averaged more than one citation per year by scholars who list evidence as one of their teaching fields in the AALS
Directory of Law Teachers, and five of the sixteen articles that
were published before 2000 have no citations from evidence teachers. The papers that average more than one citation, Professor

Rasmusen's article 256 and the article by Posner on which I have

256Eric Rasmusen, Mezzanatto and the Economics of Self-Incrimination, 19 Cardozo
L. Rev. 1541 (1998).
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commented, do not change the picture. Two of the three evidence
scholars who cite Rasmusen's paper were commenting on it in a
symposium issue of the Cardozo Law Review,257 and Posner's work
is cited in one article for a point that is not original to him258 and in
another article that persuasively argues against one of the claims
he makes.259
There are, I am sure, various reasons why the articles I identify

are seldom cited.2" Some reasons have to do with the organization
of scholarship. People tend to read the work of people whom they
know personally or by reputation. Many of the authors whose work
I identify are relatively unknown to students of evidence law, even
if they have strong reputations in law and economics.

Other reasons are revealed in the work. A number of these articles, such as one article by Professors Stephen Bundy and Einer
Elhauge26' and another by Professors Louis Kaplow and Stephen
Shavell,262 even if they touch on evidence rules, do not deal with the
law of evidence, but rather, like much of Posner's article, are concerned with information flows and the adversary system.
Some articles, including one paper by Professors Andrew
Daughety and Jennifer Reinganum263 and another by Professors

",Friedman, supra note 6, at 1534 n.14; Myrna S. Raeder, Cost-Benefit Analysis,
Unintended Consequences, and Evidentiary Policy: A Critique and a Rethinking of
the Application of a Single Set of Evidence Rules to Civil and Criminal Cases, 19
Cardozo L. Rev. 1585, 1587 n.6 (1998). This issue grew out of the meetings of the
AALS section on Evidence Law in 1997-the session topic was the economic analysis
of rules of evidence.
258 John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114
Harv. L. Rev. 511, 578 n.377 (2000) (citing to Posner for a definition of a "Type I"
error).
259 See Friedman, supra note 152, at 873-74 (arguing against Posner's claim that an
unbiased juror would have a prior probability of 1:1 on the defendant's guilt at the
start of a criminal trial).
260 I should note that I would not be surprised if Posner's article proves to gather
many more citations than the other articles in Table One. This is in part because he is
such a celebrated scholar that people who ordinarily do not search out law and
economics papers will read his work, and in part because his article is so
encompassing. But I do not believe his article will affect many people's thinking about
the law of evidence. Instead, I expect most citations will be by those who either, like
Professor Friedman, take issue with something Posner wrote or, like Professor
McGinnis, find Posner's article a convenient source to cite for a familiar proposition.

261 Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 36.
262 Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 36.
263 Daughety & Reinganum, supra note 39.

2001] Common Sense on Stilts 1707
Joel Schrag and Suzanne Scotchmer, use formal mathematical

approaches that most legal academics will find hard to follow. This
does not, however, fully explain their lack of citations. When a
formal treatment yields important results, people give it the atten-

tion needed to grasp its main points or other articles are written to
restate its findings without hard to understand mathematics. This
has not happened with these pieces because the assumptions on
which the technical models rest lead to justified skepticism about
the value of what follows for ordinary evidence scholarship. I expect most evidence scholars will see pieces like these not as
normative works directed to them, but as abstract think pieces
written for other economists. Even where articles are not quantitative and are easy to follow, a failure to appreciate the spectrum of
values at stake, unreal assumptions, or blindness about aspects of
the litigation process can limit their impact.265

Other articles, like Posner's article on expertS2' and the article
by Professor Bruce Hay,267 Hay and Professor Kathryn Spier,26 and
Professor Steven Salop269 make familiar points, even if the language
they make them in is unfamiliar. Finally, as with Posner's article,
many of these articles, including those by Judge Frank Easterbrook270

and Bundy and Elhauge,27' do not reach determinate conclusions.
Hence, some will find them of little help in thinking about how

264 Schrag & Scotchmer, supra note 39.
265 See Allen et al., supra note 36 (dismissing rights-based theories of the attorne
client privilege because they do not adequately explain it, without recognizing that the
privilege's contours may reflect several concerns); Jeffrey S. Parker, Daubert's Debut:
The Supreme Court, the Economics of Scientific Evidence, and the Adversarial
System, 4 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 1 (1995) (overweighing an unsubstantiated theoretical
objection to the Frye standard for admitting scientific evidence and largely ignoring
the science quality and jury/judge capacity issues that concern most courts and
commentators).

266Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of the Economic Expert Witness, 13
J. Econ. Persp. 91 (1999).

267 Bruce L. Hay, Allocating the Burden of Proof, 72 Ind. L.J. 651 (1997).

268Bruce L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, Burdens of Proof in Civil Litigation: An

Economic Perspective, 26 J. Legal Stud. 413 (1997).

269 Steven C. Salop, Evaluating Uncertain Evidence with Sir Thomas Bayes: A Note
for Teachers, 1 J. Econ. Persp. 155 (1987). This article is not in Table One because it
is not sufficiently concerned with evidence issues.

270 Easterbrook, supra note 36.
271 Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 36.
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evidence rules operate and what reforms make sense. What the
field needs is not formal analysis but empirical research.
I expect that I could make many of the foregoing criticisms, especially the last, of many articles written by established evidence
scholars dealing with core issues in the field using familiar analytic
methods. So I am not saying that the economic approach to evidence necessarily leads to work that is less sensible or practically
useful than the work scholars like me produce. But when a new
perspective, particularly one strongly associated with specialized
methods and modes of thinking, seeks to enter a new field and
wield influence there, it has to offer that field something more than
it already has. It should complement or improve on scholarship in
the field or at least offer a new way of seeing that has a prima facie
claim to validity and promises to enhance thinking about problems
that have long puzzled the field. Whether or not one likes the results, I believe the economic perspective has done this for areas of
law like torts, contracts, and commercial law. I do not see Posner's
article or the articles collected in Table One as doing this for the
field of evidence law. Nor do I think that the likelihood that future
economics scholarship will bring these blessings is great.
This does not mean there is no place for economic thinking in
evidence scholarship. As I pointed out at the start, one reason to
expect only a small marginal gain from involving economists in
evidence is because so much thinking and writing about evidence
law already applies cost-benefit models. Although this is usually
done verbally and less rigorously than economists like, much of this
scholarship seems sensitive enough to yield conclusions congruent
with what more formal modeling efforts would show. Indeed, informal modeling often may be superior to formal treatments,
because the "soft" cost-benefit analyses that motivate most normative evidence scholarship easily incorporate values, like justice, that
formal economic models generally slight. What is needed to improve both positive and normative evidence scholarship is not
formal rigor but empirical research that reveals how evidence rules
play out in the real world. The economists with the most to offer
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evidence scholarship are likely to be empirical rather than theoretical economists.272
So far empirical economists have kept their distance from the
law of evidence. This is not surprising. With the exception of some

psychologists,273 few scholars have attempted to shed an empirical
light on evidentiary issues. One reason for our lack of empirical

knowledge is that it is hard to study the effects of evidence rules
outside the laboratory, and laboratory studies raise substantial external validity problems. Such studies are particularly inadequate if
one is interested in the economic ramifications of rules of evidence.
Perhaps the greatest strength of economists writing on evidence
issues is the field's core concern with social costs.274 Evidence scholars have not been oblivious to issues of social costs, and commonly
seek to estimate the impact that evidence rules have outside the
courtroom. But they tend to bracket such issues as the cost of incorrect verdicts and seldom think about social costs as rigorously
or in as encompassing a fashion as economists do. Nor are they as
concerned as economists are with tracing the incentive effects of
evidence rules throughout the social structure. If there is a unique
contribution economists can make to the study of evidence, it is to
draw attention to social cost and incentive issues. The difficulty, as
my critique of Posner's article reveals, is that without more of an
empirical base, formal analysis can only take us so far. Nevertheless, research that thoroughly explores an area can be helpful.
Of the articles I read in preparing this paper, one stands out. It is
the article by Bundy and Elhauge.275 Their encompassing rational
actor view of how litigation advice influences information reaching
a tribunal provides a good foothold for thinking about the social

272 I recognize that the distinction is not rigid and that the best empirical economis
are well versed in and regularly draw on economic theory. I also do not mean to
suggest that formal modeling is necessarily of no use in understanding or criticizing
evidence law. Rather, I am speaking to issues of likely relative value.
273 See, e.g., Valerie P. Hans & Neil Vidmar, Judging the Jury (1986); Shari Seidman
Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding the Jury to Verdict Consequences:
Damages, Experts, and the Civil Jury, 26 Law & Soc'y Rev. 513 (1992); Miene et al.,
supra note 187; Wells, supra note 138.

274 Perhaps the fundamental weakness of Posner's article is that he frequently loses
sight of the possible social cost implications of his suggestions because of his early
(and flawed) move to translate social costs to deterrence and, hence, to correct
verdicts.

275 Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 36.
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costs of the adversary system, and it has implications, some of
which they draw out, for the attorney-client privilege and work
product protection. Ultimately, Bundy and Elhauge conclude that
the implications of their rational actor model are indeterminate
and that understanding what confidentiality rules portend for information reaching tribunals requires empirical investigation. But
they also make a strong case for the proposition that, more often
than not, we can expect existing confidentiality rules to have salutary effects. At the same time, they suggest that in thinking about
confidentiality rules and the adversary system, less thorough economic analyses than theirs are likely to be of little help, if not
misleading.276 Bundy and Elhauge also recognize that their rational

actor model ignores values that the legal system and the regime of
law might seek to promote. Hence, no normative conclusions
would necessarily follow from their results, even if their analysis
reached determinate conclusions. Despite these limitations, their
article has much to offer those who labor in the vineyards of evidence law: It clears conceptual ground, it rigorously and plausibly
traces out implications of evidence rules, and it suggests areas where
empirical research might have the largest payoffs.

On this note of reconciliation, I shall end what I hope my
economist friends, and especially Judge Posner, will recognize as a
friendly, if serious, critique. It is friendly in that I see scholars who
approach the law from an economics perspective as passionately
devoted to the same goals I am: to better understand the logic of
legal rules, to learn how legal rules actually work, and to use this
knowledge to improve them. Without serious critique, this will not
happen.
V. INVASION AND AFTERMATH (A FABLE'S CONCLUSION)

Following the banner of Sir Richard, economists did invade Evidenceland, not in anything like the numbers that had descended on
the Kingdoms of Torts and of Contracts, but more than Evidenceland had ever seen. They even converted a few of the natives to their
religion, but most of the territory's people ignored the invaders and

276 Id. See their running critique of Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 36, and their
comments on the limitations of the Allen et al. model, supra note 36. Bundy &
Elhauge, supra note 36.
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went on with their lives and writing as they had before. Some of the

more perceptive natives noticed that the newcomers' religion had
some remarkable similarities to their own, but the invaders' rituals
were so unusual and confusing, and their priests so often seemed to
have their heads in the clouds, that there was no temptation to convert.

As the years passed, some invading economists went native or at

least showed respect for the natives' traditions, even to the point of
incorporating some of the natives' beliefs in their rituals. A few
made their disdain for the natives' simplicity clear, not realizing that
many of the natives, when they noticed them at all, regarded them
with similar disdain and as being of no use to anyone. Most economists, however, after barely exploring the territory, left for kingdoms
where they felt more welcome.
As for Sir Richard, the wise Law Lord, he was unprepared for the
wrath of some of Evidenceland's inhabitants, but they calmed down
and so did he. Rather than try to conquer the land, he staked out a
small corner of it, and for a few years he returned from time to time
to sow seeds, though the harvest was typically meager. Although

most of his neighbors never seemed to warm to him, many claimed
to honor him despite his heretical views, and he found himself more
than occasionally invited to the land's great feasts. These might have
been more enjoyable had his toasts not so often been returned by an
enemy rather than a friend. After a few years, as it had so often in
the past, wanderlust took hold, and he gave up his fields in Evidenceland to the few vassals he had acquired and went off in search
offresh adventure.

Looking back at Sir Richard's forays left the inhabitants of Evidenceland with mixed feelings. Many liked the idea that they had
gotten some attention in the far off country of LawAndEconomics, a
rich territory, where almost everyone claimed to be of noble blood,

and a place where few of Evidenceland's inhabitants had ever ventured. Others, however, feared their land was polluted forever,
continually quarreled with Sir Richard's vassals and wished Sir
Richard had never come. A few perspicacious residents even felt a
bit guilty, for they wondered after Sir Richard's departure if they had
not been less willing to learn from him than he was from them.
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As for the soothsayer, he was delighted when he saw his predictions realized. For, truth be told, he always knew he might be wrong.
What would occur was, after all, an empirical question.277

277 Judge Posner concludes his response to my critique by saying I want "to strangle
the infant [economic analysis of evidence law] in its crib." See Posner, supra note 31,
at 1721. This is not what I want. Rather, I am curious about whether it will thrive and
do not think the prognosis is good. I could be wrong. Indeed, maybe this critique will
help make me wrong, for it might induce some economists to turn to topics in
evidence law in order to prove my views mistaken. Moreover, as the careful reader
will have noted, I have not been reluctant to employ economic reasoning in this
article, and I have suggested some paths that the economic analysis of evidence law
might take. If economic analysis can lead to a better understanding of evidence law
and wiser policy prescriptions, I will join Judge Posner in applauding the results. We
differ not in our desired ends but in our expectations of the likely utility of economics
in taking us there.

